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The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in 
Bangkok in 1967, by the five founding governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Its sixth member, Brunei Darussalam, joined 
the Association in 1984, shortly after its independence. 
ASEAN stresses its objective in promoting economic growth through regional 
cooperation, but the facts speak for only modest achievements in this area. On the 
other hand, ASEAN is known for its political diplomatic achievement, culminating 
during the Kampuchean conflict. 
Established by members as a framework to contain regional disputes, the 
Association sought an active role in shaping regional order and stability. Despite 
its lack of a military-security role, ASEAN has been able to coordinate their 
regional policies with relative harmony and to some political effect. 
This thesis examines ASEAN's involvement in the Southeast Asian security 
issues, from its establishment to present day. The issues cover ASEAN's internal 
and external relations. Challenges and opportunities faced by ASEAN in the post-
cold war era are also discussed. 
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The Association of South-East Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established in 
August 1967 at a meeting in Bangkok by representatives of the five founding 
governments of Indonesia, Malaysia. the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The 
membership was hoped to encompass all states of Southeast Asia, but that goal has not 
been realized. Since its inception, ASEAN' s membership has only been augmented by the 
admission of Brunei in January 1984. Indochina, after the political settlement of the 
Kampuchean conflict, might find its way into the membership of the Association in the 
future. In the circumstances, Burma is the only regional state which still keeps its distance 
from the Association. 
Despite its primary goals of promoting economic growth, social progress and 
cultural development through regional cooperation, ASEAN's achievement is only modest 
in that area. Intra-ASEAN trade, for example, has generally failed to reach twenty percent 
of the total overall regional trade over the last two and a half decades. Within that intra-
ASEAN trade, Preferential Tariff Arrangements (PTA) has only accounted for about two 
percent, which shows that the promotion of national interests has continued to be the 
order of the day [Ref. 1]. 
Apart from its modest record in economic cooperation, ASEAN has displayed a 
quality of political cohesion and diplomatic accomplishments unanticipated at the outset. 
The success has lifted ASEAN's status in the world community, and the Association is 
frequently cited as a "shining example" of Third World cooperation. Its international 
reputation as a diplomatic community derives from an evolving practice of bureaucratic 
and ministerial consultation. This practice has enabled member governments to coordinate 
their regional policies with relative harmony and to some political effect. 
It was A SEAN's established position in the world community which enabled its 
members to direct their collective energy in the Kampuchean conflict against Vietnam's 
invasion. An ability to influence international recognition was the major weapon in 
ASEAN's diplomatic armory. It is perhaps the only diplomatic weapon that ASEAN has, 
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yet it is effective. The engagement in the Kampuchean conflict itself indicates A SEAN's 
preoccupation with the problems of regional security. Returning to the establishment of 
the Association, security was undeniably uppermost in the minds of ASEAN's founding 
fathers, although it was not conspicously addressed. Instead, it was put in practical terms 
as a by-product of institutionalized regional reconciliation. By the time of the Vietnamese 
invasion to Kampuchea, ASEAN moved beyond the initial and continuing practice of 
intramural dispute management. Its involvement in the Kampuchean conflict indicated 
ASEAN's commitment to redressing the regional balance of power, by denying Vietnam's 
dominance in Indochina. 
Wherever governments cooperate with security in mind, it is usual for their 
collective enterprise to assume some military form. ASEAN is an exception to this rule. 
Defense cooperation does take place among ASEAN members, but only outside the 
formal structure of the Association. The restricted nature of that cooperation supports the 
insistence of its governments that their multilateral arrangements have neither embodied 
the obligations nor assumed the structure of an alliance. However, as indicated in the 
Kampuchean conflict, ASEAN has assumed a role which traditionally has required the 
instrumentality and means of an alliance, although limited to diplomatic measures. 
Accordingly, a security role has been pursued in informal coalition with extra-regional 
powers which provide material and coercive capability [Ref. 2]. The net effect of such 
an enterprise has been mixed because it has exposed differences of strategic perspective 
among member governments. As a result, the institutional experience of ASEAN 
comprises both solidarity and strain. 
In entering the post-cold war era, ASEAN faces new challenges towards the 
uncertain future of regional environment which arises from the rapid changes in the old 
world order. What was an early optimism for post-cold war regional stability generated 
by the end of the US-Soviet and Sino-Soviet rivalries has now been substantially eroded. 
Major retrenchment in the superpower military presence in the region has been observed 
with apprehension by ASEAN states for the fear of a possible scramble by regional 
powers to seek dominance. Several major security problems have also surfaced and 
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assumed significant position in ASEAN's security consideration. Among these are the 
factors of domestic stability, intra-ASEAN territorial disputes and the Spratly Islands 
dispute. 
In responding to post-cold war security challenges, ASEAN's guiding principle has 
been its familiar quest for security autonomy, and a desire to ensure it has a major voice 
and role in shaping any regional order framework. In the changing security environment, 
this requires a reconsideration of, and adjustment to, some of the long-held assumptions 
and principles underlying ASEAN regionalism, especially those related to the ZOPFAN 
concept, security ties with external powers, security dialogue and specific measures to 
enhance confidence and cooperation in military-security matters. A SEAN's responses 
indicate both continuity and change in the search for a new regional order. 
3 
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II. STEPS IN REGIONAL RECONCILIATION 
A. PRE ASEAN ORGANIZATIONS 
The first regional grouping that emerged as result of pure initiatives by Southeast 
Asian countries was the Association of Southeast Asia, or ASA. The initial proposal for 
such a grouping was made by Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman during his 
official visit to the Philippines in January 1959. Talks and discussions led to the final 
meeting in Bangkok on 31 July 1961 when ASA was formally established. Its 
membership consisted of Malaya, the Philippines, and Thailand. [Ref. 2,3] 
Unfortunately, the institution did not survive long enough to work on its 
objectives, which emphasized cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, scientific, and 
administrative fields. The territorial dispute over part of Northern Borneo, caused by the 
Philippine's claim over Sabah in June 1962, had contributed to the steady deterioration 
in relations between Malaya and the Philippines. In addition, opposition by Indonesia's 
President Sukarno upon the formation of the Federation of Malaysia had made ASA a 
casualty of wider conflict. By mid 1963, the Association became inactive. [Ref. 2,3] 
The conflict between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia led to a series of 
conferences in Manila between July-August 1963, in which the three governments agreed 
to establish a confederal entity of Greater Malay Confederation or MAPHILINDO, an 
acronym corresponding to the names of its three participants. Maphilindo was a 
diplomatic device intended to discuss the respective differences over the territorial 
boundaries and establishment of Malaysia. Genuine reconciliation proved impossible to 
attain, however. Maphilindo foundered with the formation of Malaysia on 16 September 
1963 before it could assume any kind of institutional existence beyond its declaratory 
establishment. [Ref. 2,3] 
The development of events in the region in 1965 and 1966 opened a new way in 
the efforts to end regional conflicts. The abortive coup of 1 October 1965 by the 
Communist Party in Indonesia led to the political demise of President Sukarno, whose 




seriously disrupted relations with neighboring countries. Meanwhile, President Marcos' 
election in November 1965 resulted in the "soft pedalling" of the Sabah claim by the 
Philippines. The subsequent improvement in relation with Malaysia enabled the revival 
of ASA in March 1966. [Ref. 2,3] 
During the late 1965 and through the early 1966, Indonesian and Malaysian 
officials met for discussions with the objective of bringing confrontation to an end. These 
discussions led to formal talks in Bangkok on 29 May to 1 June 1966 between Malaysia's 
Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, and Indonesia's Foreign Minister Adam Malik. 
Acting as the host was Thai's Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, who had for some time 
previously been playing a mediatory role in seeking solutions to the confrontation and the 
Philippine's claim to Sabah. Finally, in August 1966 Indonesia and Malaysia concluded 
an agreement that formally ended confrontation. [Ref. 2,3] 
B. BIRTH OF ASEAN 
During the formal talks in an effort to end the confrontation with Malaysia in 
1966, Indonesia's military establishment under General Suharto expressed the desire to 
start a new regional cooperation through a new organization. The government of 
Malaysia, in particular its Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman felt there was no need 
to form a new organization. He proposed continuing ASA, which almost at the same time 
had been reactivated in March 1966 with a meeting in Bangkok. But the new military 
ruler in Indonesia argued that ASA had been connotated with anti-Communist and pro-
Western groupings whose motivations were primarily political. Joining ASA would give 
President Sukarno, who was still fighting for his political life, a chance to charge that the 
new government had allowed Indonesia to be humbled by agreeing to join a tainted 
organization. [Ref. 2] 
In its proposal for the new organization, Indonesia proposed the idea of adopting 
the concept of Maphilindo, which stressed a regionally self reliant approach to the 
management of security. An initial draft for joint declaration proposing the establishment 
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of a new regional cooperation, which was drawn by Indonesia and Thailand, adopted the 
formulation from Manila Agreement of Maphilindo, that 
foreign bases are temporary in nature and should not be used directly or 
indirectly to subvert the national independence of Asian Countries, 
and ... arrangements of collective defence should not be used to serve the 
particular interest of any of the big powers. [Ref. 3] 
When the draft was circulated among prospective regional partners, strong objections 
came from Singapore and the Philippines, as well as reservations from Malaysia. For their 
part, the access to external sources of countervailing power was still regarded as a direct 
practical relevance to national security [Ref. 2]. 
With the encouragement from Thai's Prime Minister Thanat Khoman, those 
prospective regional partners were finally accomodating. Indonesia's insistence on 
incorporating some of the themes of Maphilindo prevailed. As a result, the conventional 
wisdom of a regional outlook which spanned both the Sukarno and Suharto 
administrations was incorporated in the preamble to the ASEAN declaration. The 
formulation agreed upon stated that 
foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed 
concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used 
directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of 
states in the area. [Ref. 3] 
The name of ASEAN was coined by Indonesia's Foreign Minister Adam Malik. 
An initial proposal for a South-East Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SEAARC) was withdrawn in favor of Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), a term which gave the impression of continuity with the Association of 
Southeast Asia (ASA). Indeed, it is true that in essence, the creation of ASEAN means 
that ASA rather than disappearing has simply been enlarged and given a new name. 
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Finally on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, and the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia signed 
a declaration establishing the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). 
C. THE AIMS AND PURPOSES 
In Bangkok (A SEAN) Declaration of 1967, the Association listed its aims and 
purposes as: 
1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development 
in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership 
in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful 
community of South-East Asian Nations. 
2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice 
and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and 
adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter. 
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common 
interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and 
administrative fields. 
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research 
facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres. 
5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture 
and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the 
problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their 
transportation and communications facilities and the raising of the living 
standards of their peoples. 
6. To promote South-East Asian studies. 
7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and 
regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all 
avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves. 
Among these goals, the objective to promote economic growth through regional 
cooperation was considered to be the most important and given emphasis by its members 
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[Ref. 2]. But it also cannot be denied that regional security was the prime preoccupation 
of its founders. The establishment of ASEAN was intended as a mean to expand and 
institutionalize the process of reconciliation which had paved the way for a political 
settlement to Indonesia's coercive challenge to the legitimacy of Malaysia between 1963 
to 1966 [Ref. 2]. Through developing a structure of special relationships and cooperation, 
it was argued that regional disputes and more deep-seated contentions could effectively 
be managed and overcome. 
This approach to regional security was then joined to the approach of coping with 
internal security. In the experience of the governments of post-colonial Southeast Asia, 
they all had witnessed internal political challenges which had attracted popular support 
partly because of economic deprivation. And it led to a basic consensus among them that 
poverty is the prime cause of political discontent because it provides a fertile soil in 
which revolutionary forces can flourish [Ref. 2]. Thus, fighting internal threats through 
its economic causes was chosen as ASEAN's primary goal. 
Bringing it further, it was assumed that political stability attained in any one 
member state would contribute to the attainment of such a desirable condition in others. 
This concept is actually an expanded form of the Indonesian government's national 
doctrine of National Resilience. National resilience is a slogan first employed by President 
Suharto and became an article of political faith in Indonesia from the late 1960's. As 
explained by President Suharto: 
National resilience means, internally, the ability to ensure the necessary 
social changes while keeping one's own identity, with all its vulnerability, 
and externally, it is the ability to face all external threats, regardless of 
their manifestations. National resilience, therefore, covers the strengthening 
of all the component elements in the development of a nation in its 
entirety, thus consisting of resilience in the ideological, political, economic, 
social, cultural and military fields. Since national resilience emanates from 
the need to foster continuously the development process of a nation, it 
naturally follows that the degree of emphasis accorded to particular 
problems at a given period or stage of development will be determined by 
the particular condition and requirements of that nation itself. If each 
member country develops its own national resilience, gradually a regional 
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resilience may emerge, i.e., the ability of member countries to settle jointly 
their common problems and look after their future and well-being together. 
[Ref. 2] 
The founding assumption about the positive relationship between economic 
development and security was not unique to ASEAN, however. Tunku Abdul Rahman's 
proposal for ASA represented an attempt to break away from a military approach to 
regional security, exemplified by the Manila Pact and SEATO*, which had failed to 
demonstrate its efficacy. The ideal objective was to confront problems of political stability 
through collective attention to their economic causes. This became the joint outlook of 
the three governments - Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, when they decided to 
establish ASA in 1961. Although ASA foundered politically within two years, primarily 
because of a territorial dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines, that joint outlook 
survived when it was superseded by ASEAN. 
D. INTRAMURAL TENSIONS 
ASEAN's regional cooperation requires effort by its members to cultivate a habit 
of harmony within the extended set of multilateral relationship. This proved to be difficult 
however. During the early years of ASEAN, tensions and mistrust often characterized the 
relationships between member governments so that at some point, the survival of the 
Association was threatened. 
1. _Sabah Claim: Malaysia and The Philippines 
Sabah is a territorial area in Northern Borneo, and has been a member of the 
Federation of Malaysia since its formation in 1963. The Philippine's claim over Sabah 
was based on historical perspective and old documents. It was filed for the first time in 
*SEATO (South-East Asia Treaty Organization) was the organizational structure for 
the Manila Pact of 1954 designed to contain Communist China. It was inspired by U.S. 
calculations of interest and backed by U.S. military capability. Member countries were 
Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, Great Britain, and 
United States. SEATO was disbanded in 1977, although the pact has not been revoked. 
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June 1962. The continuing claim by the Philippines is the prime cause in the strained 
relationship between both countries. 
a. Historical Background 
Sabah, in the northern part of Borneo Island, was originally ruled by the 
Sultan of Brunei. In 1704, the Sultan of Sulu helped suppress an uprising there, and as 
a reward, Sabah was ceded to Sulu. When the Europeans came to Southeast Asia for 
valuable minerals, spices, and other rich sources of revenue, Sabah was then leased for 
5,000 Malaysian dollars in 1878. The British North Borneo Company held the royal 
charter for the lease. [Ref. 4] 
In the course of laying the groundwork for the Philippine's independence, 
the U.S. and British governments signed a treaty in 1930 defining the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Philippine Republic. This treaty did not include Sabah within the 
boundaries of Spanish, American, or Philippine jurisdiction. After the Philippine was 
granted independence on 10 July 1946, within a week the British North Borneo Company 
turned over all its rights and obligations to the British government, which in turns 
assumed full sovereignty rights over Sabah. [Ref. 4] 
During 1946-1962 period, the Philippines apparently conducted 
investigations on historical documents before filing any such a claim. In April 1950, 
House Resolution no.42 adopted an explicit statement that North Borneo belonged to the 
heirs of the Sultan of Sulu, and authorized the president to conduct negotiations for the 
restoration of sovereign jurisdiction. It was not until June 1962 that the Philippines 
notified the British governments of its claim over Sabah. But the British rejected the 
Philippine's claim and incorporated Sabah into the newly formed the Federation of 
Malaysia in September 1963. [Ref. 4] 
b. The Strained Relationship 
In June 1966, the diplomatic relations which broke off on the establishment 
of Malaysia were restored. As the formation of ASEAN was on the way, there seemed 
to be a tacit agreement between Malaysia and the Philippines that the issue be shelved 
in the interest of regional solidarity. They also agreed that it should be finally resolved 
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through ASEAN [Ref. 4]. However, in more than a quarter of a century since the 
formation of ASEAN, the Sabah dispute has not been resolved, yet. 
In April 1967, President Marcos refused to send observers to witness the 
first direct elections in Sabah. This decision was taken on the ground that the presence 
of the Philippine observers might prejudice the validity of the claim to Sabah. In the 
event, the elections, attended by Indonesian observers, assumed the character of a 
plebiscite. The result reaffirmed Sabah's commitment to membership of the Federation 
of Malaysia. [Ref. 2] 
In March 1968, the relationship between both countries deteriorated with 
an incident to be known as the Corregidor Affair. Although there was, and still is, 
considerable uncertainty about what exactly happened, it appeared that the incident 
involved a special military force of Filipino Muslims recruited allegedly to train as 
insurgents for infiltration to Sabah. A survivor maintained that a number of the recruits 
had been shot by their officers when they had mutinied in reaction to harsh discipline and 
non-payment of wages. The Malaysian government announced other evidence of an 
infiltration attempt of prior arrest of 26 armed Filipinos in Sabah, and lodged a formal 
protest. In reaction, the Philippine government appeared to try to cover up its political 
embarrassment at home and abroad by reviving attention to the Sabah claim. [Ref. 2] 
In this case, ASEAN was not the first resort of the two government. It was 
not used either for containing tension or for dispute settlement. Malaysia tried to bring 
the matter to the United Nations while the Philippines adopted the view that the episode 
was purely an internal affair. The relationship between both countries was further 
aggravated when senior officials met in Bangkok in June - July 1968 for further 
discussions on the Sabah claim. The discussions proved to be fruitless, serving only to 
exacerbate existing frictions. The delegation of Malaysia walked out of the meeting. The 
Permanent Head of Malaysia's Foreign Ministry pointedly remarked that the persistent 
pursuit of the claim to Sabah by the Philippines "will (also) destroy any cooperation in 
the regional and international spheres such as ASEAN." The Philippine government 
responded by announcing the withdrawal of its ambassador from Kuala Lumpur. [Ref. 2] 
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During the second meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers in August 1968 
in Jakarta, the organization eventually became involved in the dispute. Indonesia's 
Foreign Minister Adam Malik seized the opportunity of the ministerial meeting to 
encourage reconciliation between Malaysia and the Philippines. Malaysia's Deputy Prime 
Minister Tun Abdul Razak met in private with Philippine Foreign Minister Narciso 
Ramos. The outcome was an agreement to have a "cooling-off" period in the dispute 
between two governments, but apparently without any consensus as to what this meant. 
[Ref. 2] 
Any optimism over the role of ASEAN in helping to reconcile tensions 
between two of its members proved to be short-lived. In September 1968, President 
Marcos signed an act passed by the Philippine Congress which defined the baselines of 
the Republic's territorial sea. It incorporated an amendment to the effect that it had 
acquired dominion and sovereignty over Sabah. President Marcos made a statement that 
the Philippines enjoyed sovereignty over the territory. He also pointed out that although 
his government did not contemplate physical incorporation of Sabah, the Republic's 
national boundaries would be revised accordingly when the right to exercise sovereignty 
had received international recognition. Malaysian request for confirmation that the 
government of the Philippines respects the Federation's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, including Sabah as a constituent state, met with a negative response. The 
response provoked a heated exchange, and matters were aggravated further when a 
Philippine delegate to the ASEAN Committee on Commerce and Industry meeting in 
October 1968, questioned the competence of his Malaysian counterpart to represent Sa bah. 
The practice of questioning the competence of Malaysian delegates to speak for Sabah 
prompted their withdrawal from all ASEAN meetings until it was discontinued. [Ref. 2] 
In the third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Malaysia in December 1969, 
ASEAN once again encouraged both Malaysia and the Philippines to settle their dispute. 
The Philippine's Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo went to have a private discussion with 
Malaysia's Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. The result was an announcement that 
Malaysia and the Philippines had agreed to restore diplomatic relations without any 
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preconditions. In the joint communique issued by the Ministerial Meeting, it was 
mentioned that the restoration of diplomatic relations had been agreed "because of the 
great value which Malaysia and the Philippines placed on ASEAN." Although the 
statement may be accepted to a limited extent given the fact that the dispute had occured 
in a context of disturbing regional order, it served to demonstrate the capacity of ASEAN 
to keep its corporate house in order. [Ref. 2] 
The plan for the first ASEAN Summit meeting in February 1976 in 
Indonesia was not received with enthusiasm in Malaysia, due to the unresolved Sabah 
claim. The Summit was convened only after Indonesia's government had secured an 
assurance from its Philippine counterpart that Sabah issue would not be raised. In the 
second A SEAN Summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1977, President Marcos made a 
public statement which gave the strong impression that his government would drop its 
claim to Sabah in the interest of ASEAN unity. A seeming confirmation of his good 
intent was followed by his subsequent visit to Sabah, which was widely interpreted as 
recognition of Malaysia's sovereign position. The Malaysian government then insisted that 
such recognition be expressed through a revision of the Philippine Constitution, which in 
its new form had included a statement in its preamble which could be interpreted as 
claiming jurisdiction over Sabah. President Marcos failed to accommodate Malaysia over 
this demand. [Ref. 2] 
It is important to note that the bilateral relationship between Malaysia and 
the Philippines did not begin to recover fully until the political downfall of President 
Marcos in 1986. Also, no Malaysian Prime Minister visited Manila after the Corregidor 
Affair until the third Summit in 1987. Indeed, the continuing strain in Malaysia-Philippine 
relations was a factor in delaying a third meeting of ASEAN heads of government. [Ref. 
2] 
When Mrs. Corazon Aquino assumed presidential office, bilateral 
discussion were revived at the level of foreign minister to try to settle the claim. In 
November 1987, President Aquino initiated legislation redefining the archipelagic 
baselines of the Philippines without reference to Sabah in a deliberate attempt to improve 
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relations with Malaysia. But unfavorable reaction in Congress made it necessary to 
introduced revised legislation incorporating conditions to be met by Malaysia before the 
claim would be dropped officially. [Ref. 2] 
c. The Moro Connection 
For their part, the Philippines cannot just drop its claim to Sabah. In its 
southern region, the Philippines has been bothered by the separatist Moros from the Sulu 
Archipelago. Located only 10 miles from Sulu, Sabah is a Philippine security concern. 
Control of the northern tip of Borneo by an unfriendly power would constitute a serious 
threat to the country. In this context, Malaysia has been implicated in the Muslim conflict 
from the beginning, accused of providing aid and facilities for the Moros [Ref. 4]. The 
inter-relation between Sabah and Mora is thus prolonging the settlement of the dispute 
and deepening the security concerns of the Philippine government. 
During 1970s, the ruler of Sabah Tun Mustapha was suspected by the 
Philippines of tolerating, even assisting the provision of military supplies to the Muslim 
rebels and providing sanctuary for Mora fighters. Although his successors showed no 
indication of following the policy of accomodation, the Malaysian government was 
repeatedly accused of helping the Moros. In October 1980, Philippine Admiral Romulo 
Espaldo claimed that the Malaysian government was tolerating secessionist Moro training 
camps in Sabah [Ref. 4]. In April 1982, a television documentary was aired in Australia 
which claimed that British and Australian mercenaries were training Filipino Muslim 
guerillas in Malaysian jungle camps under the financing of Libyan Muammar Ghaddafi 
[Ref. 4]. Although the Malaysian government denied its involvement in the Mora 
struggle, it is quite possible that Sabah and other Malaysian Muslim sectors did give 
assistance to the Moros. Apart from their commitment to religious duty, Malaysia's 
involvement in the Mora's struggle was to pressure the Philippines over its continuing 
claim of Sabah. 
The complexity of the Sabah claim has contributed to the prolongation of 
its settlement. While both Malaysia and the Philippines understand that it in no way 
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serves the long term interests of either country, the prospects are still uncertain. 
Meanwhile, the strained relationships between the two countries will likely continue. 
2. Between Two Giants: Singapore and Malaysia and Indonesia 
Another example of intra-ASEAN tensions is the relationship between Singapore 
and its two Malay neighbors, Indonesia and Malaysia. The tension arose from the related 
circumstances of its separation from Malaysia and then Malaysia's rapprochement with 
Indonesia. Singapore's minute scale, circumscribed location, regional entrepot role, and 
prevailing ethnic Chinese identity gave its government an acute sense of vulnerability. 
Suspicious of being "consumed" by its larger neighbors and aware of its limitation in 
defense capability, the government of Singapore decided to adopt an abrasive international 
posture in order to secure respect, especially from the "potential predators" such as 
Malaysia and Indonesia in particular [Ref. 2]. Singapore was hypersensitive to any 
presumed challenges to its independence and sovereignty. 
The relationship between Malaysia and Singapore had not fully developed until 
Mahathir Mohammad became Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981. Previously, politicians 
from both states appeared incapable of refraining from commenting publicly on matters 
within one another's domestic domain. One incident invoved the cancellation of the first 
official visit to Malaysia by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew in August 1970. 
It started when two Malaysian youths with lengthy hair visited Singapore. In the 
immigration office, they were ordered to cut their hair, in keeping with the prevailing 
social ethic in Singapore that long hair was a sign of moral degeneracy [Ref. 2]. The 
incident provoked a furor across the causeway in a symptomatic expression of resentment. 
It took two years before Lee Kuan Yew finally visited Malaysia. 
A more serious tension occured between Singapore and Indonesia, in which two 
Indonesian marines who had been found guilty of committing acts of sabotage (during 
Sukarno's confrontation era) were hung in Singapore in October 1968. The plea by 
Indonesia's President General Suharto, augmented by that of Malaysian Prime Minister 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, went unanswered because of the belief in Singapore that to do so 
would suggest a willingness to give in to external pressure. The execution of the two 
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marines provoked a public riot in Jakarta, in which the Singapore Embassy and the local 
Chinese community were attacked. 
Despite popular pressure on the government to take strong retaliatory action, the 
Indonesian government chose not to sacrifice the bilateral relationship with Singapore in 
the interest of the development and viability of the newly born ASEAN. Indonesia's 
Foreign Minister Adam Malik took the view that there were more important issues at 
stake than the bilateral relationship with Singapore and that the Republic's larger interest 
would be better served by avoiding a diplomatic breach reminiscent of Sukarno' s 
confrontation [Ref. 2]. A measure of public disorder in Jakarta was countenanced as a 
mean of satisfying national honor, while the bodies of the two marines were received in 
Indonesia with full military honors and then buried in the national heroes' cemetery. 
The relationship between Singapore and Indonesia soon settled down. When 
Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew visited Jakarta in May 1973, he made a 
personal act of contrition by scattering flowers petals on the graves of the two executed 
marines in Kalibata heroes' cemetery. It indicated a shift in Singapore's view towards 
Indonesia, which now had come to the seriousness of Jakarta's commitment to ASEAN 
and regional cooperation. The Indonesian ruling military establishment was gradually 
viewed as "pragmatists", applying a policy of regional cooperation in the interest of 
economic development. 
In the case of Singapore and Malaysia, the traumatic political event of separation 
contributed to the slow process of stabilization between both countries. They were bound 
together within a common colonial structure with a legacy of economic links and personal 
and family ties. Singapore's inclusion into the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 was viewed 
as the restoration of a natural unity. But the separation in 1965, less than two years after 
the merger, left problems of political adjustment on both sides, which caused the tendency 
to interfere in other's domestic matters. 
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3. Common Border Problems: Malaysia and Thailand 
Although the bilateral tensions between Malaysia and Thailand had considerably 
been muted in the wake ASEAN's formation (and earlier in the short-lived ASA), 
differences still occur upon their border problems. Back in 1950's, Kuala Lumpur 
perceived the Malayan Communist Party in the northern border with Thailand as the 
principal threat. Operations by British forces caused the guerillas to retreat further to the 
north into Thailand. An agreement was then made between both governments for joint 
operations. 
Tensions arose when Thailand showed a bit of reluctance to deal with the active 
remnant of the Malayan Communist Party. Thailand viewed the communists as posing 
only a minimal threat to its national security because their political ambition was 
southward. Accordingly, Thai security forces did not approach the communists with the 
same sense of urgency as their Malayan counterparts. Moreover, the separatist movement 
of Malay-Muslims, which dominated Southern Thailand was the Thai's greater concern. 
Although such a movement had never succeeded in posing an effective political 
challenge, the Thai's suspicion of support from the south of the border served to 
discourage its government from instructing its security forces to engage in more than 
nominal cooperation with Malaya. [Ref. 2] 
E. A SECURITY COMMUNITY WITHOUT MILITARY PACT 
Despite all the disputes and differences that occured among member states, the 
conflicts were kept low-key and contained within the ASEAN wall, preventing them from 
damaging regional order and stability. And as the former Director of the Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies K.S. Sandhu pointed out, ASEAN has been very successful in 
managing intramural conflict that none of its members have "fired shots in anger toward 
each other for more than a quarter of a century" [Ref.l]. This fact has also led a scholar 
to identify ASEAN as a security community, following Karl Deutsch's well known 
formulation, in which expectations about warlike behavior by members of the community 
toward each other have been virtually eliminated [Ref. 5]. 
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Originally, the concept of collective security as adopted by the League of Nations, 
was meant in application to protect member states from act of agression by any of their 
numbers [Ref. 2]. It was intended to do the same for ASEAN, but not through the 
medium of sanctions. Instead, a more moderate process of reconciliation through regional 
cooperation was chosen to counter any revival of serious conflicts between member states. 
ASEAN members even linked their security interests to their national development 
programs, recognizing the security and economic interdependence. 
The reluctance of ASEAN to assume any collective military role for regional 
security might as well be explained by several reasons. First, ASEAN did not wish to be 
perceived as a successor of SEATO, which would make it vulnerable to attack by 
communist countries, such as the Soviet Union and China. Any security role would 
undoubtedly lead to provocative comparisons with SEATO, given the ASEAN's members' 
generally pro-Western orientation. Second, Indonesia in particular, did not wish to 
compromise its non-aligned status. Third, an alliance had been out of question partly 
because of the members' lack of military capability. Moreover, ASEAN's founding 
fathers had been only too aware of the danger of provoking a menacing response through 
a premature attempt to confront the problems at regional security head on in military 
form. [Ref. 2, 3] 
However, security and defense cooperation do exist among ASEAN members. It 
has been manifested in the forms of bilateral joint training and exchange in intelligence 
informations [Ref. 2]. These arrangements, as ASEAN has maintained, are conducted 
outside the formal framework of ASEAN. It exists because of mutual needs and interests 
of the respected countries, apart from their affiliation with ASEAN. 
In the early years of ASEAN however, there were moves to formalize intra-
ASEAN defense cooperation into the ASEAN framework, but soon it was dropped from 
the discussions, partly because such an arrangement would prejudice diplomatic overtures 
to Hanoi [Ref. 2]. In the opening of the Bali Summit 1976, Indonesia's President Suharto 
addressed the issue in the following statement: 
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It must be clear to us and to the world that we have no intention of 
establishing a military pact, as it was misinterpreted by some people. 
Cooperation among us in the realm of security is neither designed against 
other nor certain parties. We have neither the capability nor the intention 
to have it. Our concept of security is inward looking, namely to establish 
an orderly, peaceful and stable condition within each individual territory, 
free from any subversive elements and infiltrations, wherever from their 
origins might be. [Ref.2.] 
As the security role in military form was denied, the "getting acquainted process" 
and the intensive consultations among member states' officials have proved to play a 
significant role in smoothing ASEAN cooperation. As Malaysia's Tun Ismail pointed out 
during the Fourth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1971: "The constant contact and 
communication between our officials has helped to develop a habit of cooperation and a 
sense solidarity which will inturn help us when we move forward towards wider areas of 
cooperation." [Ref. 3]. It is in this context that better understanding of each other was 
developed, and in turn contributed to the conflict management within ASEAN. In Lee 
Kuan Yew's words: "Perhaps the most valuable achievement of ASEAN since its 
inception was the understanding and goodwill created at the various ASEAN meetings 
which had helped to lubricate relationships which could otherwise have generated 
friction." [Ref. 2]. 
F. ASEAN AND NATIONAL SELF INTERESTS 
As shown in Sabah dispute case, both Malaysia and the Philippines have agreed 
not to let the matter worsen (although not necessarily solving the problem) because of 
"the great value which Malaysia and the Philippines placed on ASEAN." But there are 
also strong indications that members see the continued existence of ASEAN as in their 
national self interest. From this point of view, ASEAN is seen by its members both as a 
means to obtain benefits and a source of benefits and advantages [Ref. 6]. Moreover, 
these benefits are relatively "cost free" in terms of scarce resources or the sacrifice of 
national sovereignty. A broader notion of regional interest seems only come into play 
when ASEAN's unity and cohesion is at stake [Ref. 7]. 
20 
An example where the membership of ASEAN is deemed very important for the 
national interest was the joining of Brunei into the Association. Like Singapore, Brunei 
is also a small state, complete with all the sense of vulnerability and suspicions towards 
its neighbors. Malaysia's alleged involvement in Brunei's December 1962 rebellion and 
the annexation of East Timor into Indonesia in 1976 made both countries seem to be 
menacing neighbors by Brunei's ruling family [Ref. 2]. ASEAN, where Indonesia and 
Malaysia occupied a prominent place, was thus viewed with corresponding suspicion. 
Although Brunei kept its distance from ASEAN until the early 1980s, it moved closer 
politically to Singapore after the separation from Malaysia, partly because of a common 
sense of vulnerability. Encouraged by the government of Singapore, which had come to 
regard membership in ASEAN as a political asset, Brunei responded positively to an 
invitation to join the Association upon its independence. By that time, ASEAN made the 
sanctity of national sovereignty the centerpiece of its public philosophy, through the 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976. From Brunei's perspective, any revealed 
challenge to the sovereign status of the Sultanate by any member of the Association 
would be certain to reflect on its international standing and credibility [Ref. 2]. 
Membership thus served the security interest of Brunei, because the five founding states 
would be obliged to restrain their political intent towards their new regional partner. 
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Ill. ASEAN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
A. SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
A series of events that took place during the late 1960s through the early 1970s 
in the international and regional environment enhanced the value that member countries 
placed on ASEAN as a vehicle for political cooperation. In January 1968, the British 
government announced an accelerated timetable for military disengagement from east of 
Suez. Following the decision was the first appearance in March 1968 of a small Soviet 
naval flotilla in the Indian Ocean, entering by way of the Straits of Malacca and 
Singapore. The presence of the Soviet ships was widely interpreted as a considered 
attempt to fill a naval vacuum created by Britain's abdication of a historical role [Ref. 3]. 
The Tet Offensive in Vietnam in January- February 1968 marked a turn-about in 
U.S. attitudes towards its involvement in the war. President Johnson's decision not to seek 
reelection and search for a negotiated solution to the war was then reaffirmed by 
President Richard Nixon's policy to end the war. In July 1969, President Nixon astounded 
U.S. partners in Asia by the so called Guam Doctrine, in which he announced that the 
United States would no longer carry the burden of conventional defense against internal 
communist challenge. It's announcement raised nervousness within ASEAN as it became 
clear that a major reappraisal of U.S. policy in Asia was underway. A growing 
antagonism between the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China had encouraged 
the Sino-US rapprochement, which was followed by President Nixon's visit to Beijing in 
February 1972. In the preceding event, the United States sponsored the transfer of China's 
seat in the United Nations to the government of the People's Republic of China, 
signalling a recognition of a new international and regional role for China [Ref.3]. 
These developments led to a perception that the old bipolar structure of major 
power relationships affecting the region had given way to a new multipolarity, in which 
the United States, Soviet Union, China and Japan -with its rapidly expanding economic 
presence in the region, would have an important influence upon events in Southeast Asia. 
This new situation was viewed ~y ASEAN members with a mixture of hope and 
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apprehension. It also led to opinion among ASEAN leaders that the new developments 
presented an opportunity and challenge to ASEAN to take an active role in the 
management of regional affairs and to exclude the disruptive effects of major powers' 
intervention and competition. 
B. NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA 
During the process of ASEAN's formation, Indonesia's initial draft argued for a 
regionally self reliant approach to the management of regional security. It represented the 
outlook of the Indonesian government that spanned the Sukarno to Suharto eras. Although 
the draft met strong objections from the prospective regional partners at first, Indonesia 
was able to retain the concept in the preamble of ASEAN Declaration. 
The development of world events: the Second Indochina War, President Nixon's 
Guam Doctrine, Sino-US rapprochement and Sino-Soviet antagonism, all contributed to 
the decision of ASEAN to take an active role in preventing the disruptive effects of major 
powers' rivalries and intervention in Southeast Asia. In 1970 through 1971, Malaysia 
initiated a proposal for the neutralization of Southeast Asia. The first statement was made 
by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affair Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, in 
April 1970 at the Preparatory Non-Aligned Conference: 
It is Malaysia's hope that non-aligned countries will be able to endorse the 
neutralization of not only the Indochina area but of the entire region of the 
Southeast Asia, guaranteed by the three major powers, the People's 
Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States, against any 
form of external interference, threat or pressure. [Ref. 3] 
The similar proposal was then presented in March 1971 at the fourth ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting in Manila by Tun Ismail. 
In the proposal, Indonesia spelled out its objections, arguing that neutralization as 
the product of one way benevolence on the part of the big powers, at this stage, would 
perhaps prove as brittle and unstable as the interrelationship between the major powers 
themselves, and that the Malaysian formula suggested the future of Southeast Asia to be 
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determined by the ministrations of major powers [Ref. 2]. Foreign Minister Adam Malik 
argued in September 1971: 
I strongly believe that it is only through developing among ourselves an 
area of internal cohesion and stability, based on indigenous socio-political 
and economic strength, that we can ever hope to assist in the early 
stabilization of a new equilibrium in the region that would not be the 
exclusive "diktat" of the major powers. [Ref. 2] 
Other members of ASEAN had also spelled out their objections. The Philippines and 
Thailand were far from ready to abandon their security ties with the United States while 
Singapore saw no realistic prospects for eliminating the great powers' role in the region 
[Ref.8]. 
In November 1971, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers met in Kuala Lumpur to review 
recent international developments and to consider Malaysia's proposal. Despite resentment 
and skepticism by other members, agreement was made by stating that the neutralization 
of Southeast Asia is a desirable objective and that ways and means of bringing about its 
realization should be explored. It further stated that 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thaliand are 
determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, 
and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside powers 
... that Southeast Asian Countries should make concerted efforts to broaden 
the means of cooperation which would contribute to their strength, 
solidarity and closer cooperation. [Ref. 2] 
The ZOPFAN Declaration however, was not issued as an ASEAN statement. 
Instead, it was announced in the name of the five governments that "coincidentally" were 
members of ASEAN. It seemed that they were not ready to identify ASEAN with so 
openly political a statement. Moreover, the declaration left unanswered a number of 
questions concerning what steps should be taken to achieve a Zone of Peace, Freedom 
and Neutrality. But despite all of its vagueness and the continuing criticism over its 
impracticability, the ZOPFAN Declaration served useful political purposes. It clarified 
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ASEAN's integrating political concept and its determination, which in Malaysia's Tun 
Abdul Razak's words: "This region will no longer be a theater of conflict for the 
competing interests of major powers." [Ref. 8]. 
C. COMMUNIST VICTORY IN INDOCHINA 
In the mid-1970's, the developments in Indochina indicated the victory of the 
communists over Western powers. The emergence of Vietnam as a military power in 
Southeast Asia and the rapprochement of Sino-US relations which recognized the People's 
Republic of China's new role in the region had created a mixed feelings among ASEAN 
members. Thailand had at first adopted a public position of antagonism towards the 
People's Republic of China. Its conventional wisdom was that the principal threat was 
posed by a monolithic international communism whose vehicle for expansion in Asia was 
the People's Republic of China, serving as patron of the Vietnamese communists [Ref. 
2]. In other words, Thailand's historical enemy, Vietnam, was placed within a wider 
context of threat. Thailand's government did not begin to draw any significant practical 
distinction between threats from Chinese and Vietnamese communism until mid-1970s 
when tension between Beijing and Hanoi became manifest in the context of Sino-Soviet 
antagonism and Sino-US rapprochement. It was at this time when Thailand's government 
changed their opinion to the singular prospect of China serving as an alternative source 
of external countervailing power against the more immediate external threat posed by a 
seemingly expansionist Vietnam. 
Indonesia, on the other hand, had established diplomatic relations with Beijing 
early after its independence in 1945. During President Sukarno's era, the relationship with 
the People's Republic of China developed into a close political alignment. But an abortive 
coup on 1 October 1965 by the Indonesian Communist Party, which was rumored to be 
sponsored by China caused the break-off in diplomatic relations. General Suharto who 
succeeded President Suk:arno, became explicit in identifying China as the principal long 
term source of external threat. Although the military victory of the Vietnamese 
communists came as a "disagreeable surprise", the conviction that Vietnam's communists 
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were primarily nationalists, arising from their challenge in 1945 to French colonialism 
concurrent with that of Indonesia's National Revolution against the Dutch, allowed 
Vietnam a special position in regional outlook [Ref. 2]. Antagonistic relations between 
Vietnam and the People's Republic of China strengthened Vietnam's position as a 
possible barrier and regional partner against any extension of Chinese influence in 
Southeast Asia in the wake of the United States' apparent strategic decline. 
The government of Malaysia adopted a strategic perspective which corresponded 
closely with that of Indonesia. Although a unilateral initiative to establish diplomatic 
relations with China had been taken in May 197 4, that initiative had been based on the 
premise that Chinese communism constituted the principle source of an external threat. 
One objective of establishing diplomatic relations had been to secure public endorsement 
from the government in Beijing in order to demonstrate both to the Communist Party of 
Malaya and the resident ethnic Chinese community, that there was no point in looking to 
China for support. This had been confirmed by the use of photographs of Prime Minister 
Tun Abdul Razak in the company of Chairman Mao Ze Dong during a general election 
in Malaysia in August 1974 [Ref. 2]. This strategy was only a partial success, however, 
as the Chinese Communist Party refused to repudiate party to party relations, while the 
insurgent Communist Party of Malaya engaged in a campaign of armed action during 
1975. Regarding Vietnam, Malaysia's foreign ministry sought to promote a special 
relationship with the country in the expectation that it could secure the kind of political 
access which would enable the political distance between Indochina and ASEAN to be 
closed. Thus, while not disregarding the buffer position of Thailand interposed between 
itself and a communist Indochina, the strategic perspective of Malaysian government was 
generally similar to Indonesia's. 
For the part of Singapore, the military success of the Vietnam communists and 
their accumulation of a huge stockpile of U.S. arms gave rise to apprehension over 
support for regional insurgency. Although wary of China and unwilling to establish 
diplomatic relations, there was little point in highlighting a Chinese threat in the context 
of the Sino-US rapprochement. Moreover, characteristically, the government of Singapore 
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was the least inclined of any ASEAN member to appear politically accomodating to any 
of the revolutionary communist regimes of Indochina in case such a stance might give the 
impression of appeasement or weakness. It was up to Vietnam, in particular, to 
demonstrate its regional bonafides. 
The Philippines, in its maritime insulation, with a relatively small ethnic Chinese 
community and protected by a mutual security treaty with the United States, did not 
exhibit any pressing concern with an immediate threat from either Vietnam or China. Its 
security problem were primarily internal, with a Muslim rebellion in the southern islands 
of the archipelago and an insurgency mounted by the communist party. 
Meanwhile, the first ASEAN Summit Meeting was convened in the island of Bali 
in Indonesia in 1976, resulted in the collective initiative to strengthen regional stability. 
A Treaty of Amity and Cooperation was signed by ASEAN members, and was designed 
as the "code of conduct" for regional order in Southeast Asia. The Treaty put emphasis 
on the sanctity of sovereignty, and contained a provision for accession by regional states 
outside ASEAN. Specifically, it was intended to serve as a political bridge to the United 
Communist Vietnam, with the hope that Vietnam might be persuaded to endorse in the 
interests of regional order and accomodation [Ref. 2]. 
The treaty, however, met with a negative response from the revolutionary 
governments of Indochina. The Vietnamese and Laotian governments in particular, not 
only ignored the opportunity to adhere to the treaty (as did that of Kampuchea), but also 
rejected publicly the credibility of ASEAN and its prescriptions for regional order. The 
blatant challenge by Vietnam and the Indochinese states to the regional credentials of the 
Association, in turn had the effect of strengthening corporate solidarity in the later course. 
In the event, ASEAN was relieved as it became evident that monolithic 
Indochinese communism was not in the making. The revolutionary government of 
Kampuchea declared an independent posture, encouraged by China, denying Vietnam's 
dominance in the peninsula. Vietnam's inability to assert full dominance in Indochina was 
welcomed by ASEAN since an inter-communist balance did not pose an imminent 
challenge to either collective or individual priorities of ASEAN states. 
28 
.-------------------------------------
By August 1977 however, the inter-communist balance of power in Indochina had 
become less stable as the result of the accelerating antagonism between Pnom Penh and 
Hanoi. Military confrontation was then followed by diplomatic break-off. On 25 
December 1978, the military confrontation between both countries reached a climax when 
the Vietnamese army invaded and occupied Kampuchea, overthrowing its notorious 
government and replacing it with an administration set up by Hanoi. 
D. ASEAN AND VIETNAM'S INVASION OF KAMPUCHEA 
1. The Players and Their Interests 
One month before the invasion of Vietnam into Kampuchea, Hanoi concluded a 
treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, signed on 3 November 1978. 
Its alliance with the Soviets proved to serve Hanoi's regional ambitions and as an 
invitation to the Soviet Union to become a major security participant in Southeast Asia. 
This further challenged ASEAN's hopes for creating a regional order, free of great power 
military activities. Moreover, it allowed the Sino-Soviet rivalry to be played out in 
ASEAN's neighborhood, which escalated security concerns among ASEAN member 
states. 
a. Vietnam 
Although economically weak, Vietnam was a formidable regional power. 
Its army was among the largest in the world, estimated at around 1.2 million personnel. 
To sustain such a huge army despite its almost crippled national economy (partly due to 
economic opportunity costs, since the military drained 1.2 million men away from the 
civilian sector and heavily distorted the national budget), Vietnam relied on Soviet's aid, 
which was estimated at $ 3 billion annually [Ref. 9]. 
In Hanoi's perspective, the Indochinese countries (Vietnam, Laos and 
Kampuchea) were security interdependent. Thus, if any one of the three states was 
subverted by an external adversary, all were threatened. Therefore, an alliance among 
them was needed to guarantee their independence. China's effort to gain a foothold in 
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Kampuchea through the Khmer Rouge was seen by Hanoi as the latest in a series of 
external efforts to annex Indochina, following the French, Japanese and Americans [Ref. 
9]. The restoration of Laos or Kampuchea as buffer states would not be acceptable to 
Hanoi, for that would mean putting Vietnam into a vulnerable position, exposed against 
China's intention to gain regional dominance. 
b. The Soviet Union 
For the Soviet Union, the alliance with Vietnam provided them with an 
opportunity to play a more direct role in Southeast Asian affairs. Hanoi had granted 
Moscow access rights to use the military fascilities at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay, 
which enabled the Soviet Union to potentially project power into the Southwest Pacific 
and the Indian Ocean, as well as Southeast Asia itself. These military facilities were 
important and necessary for an assertive Soviet policy in the region, since military power 
was the major instrument that the Soviets could utilize in extending their influence into 
the region, given their limited economic capacities and substantial political liabilities. In 
the context of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay occupied an 
important position in the Soviet's strategic encirclement of China, and might as well serve 
as a useful bargaining point in Sino-Soviet negotiations [Ref. 10]. 
c. The People's Republic of China 
In Beijing's perspective, China must play a primary role in determining 
regional order, particularly with respect to relations with major external players. 
Neighboring states must at least deny access for those extra regional actors with which 
China is in conflict [Ref. 11]. Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union clearly challenged 
Beijing's policy. Accordingly, China's primary goals in Southeast Asia were directed to 
deny any advantage to its adversaries and to establish a position of dominance vis-a-vis 
its immediate neighbors. These were reflected in China's support for the Khmer Rouge 
and through China's punitive action against Vietnam in February 1979, where China was 
prepared to sacrifice men for a limited and temporary territorial gain. 
Vietnam's invasion was viewed by China, and also by ASEAN, as illegal. 
Thus both China and ASEAN demanded the withdrawal of Vietnam's troops from 
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Kampuchea and to allow for a process of self determination by the Kampuchean people. 
This coincidence of position did not mean that ASEAN agreed with China's final solution 
for Kampuchea. ASEAN was concerned about the role of the Khmer Rouge after the 
conflict resolution, who had been the strongest party in the Kampuchean resistance and 
were continually supported by China. Indeed China's support toward communist 
movements in Southeast Asia was what caused China to be viewed as a menacing threat 
by the anti-communist governments of the ASEAN states. 
d. ASEAN 
To ASEAN, Vietnam's invasion constituted a blatant challenge to the 
public philosophy of ASEAN, namely the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity 
as envisaged by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976. The involvement of the 
Soviet Union in Southeast Asian affairs through its alliance with Vietnam and the 
potential danger of wider Sino-Soviet rivalry had also become ASEAN's major concerns. 
The divergence in member's strategic perspective, however, characterized 
the political disunity in ASEAN that was reflected in member's approach toward the 
conflict. Thailand, being a historical rival for centuries with Vietnam over the fertile 
valley of the Mekong River, had become sensitive to the communist's victory in 
Indochina in the mid-1970s. As the pro-Chinese Kampuchean government took an 
independent posture to deny Vietnam's domination in Indochina, however, Thailand 
enjoyed the Kampuchean position as buffer state against Vietnam's regional ambition. The 
fall of the independent Kampuchea in the invasion of December 1978 presented direct 
threats to Thailand's security through armed tensions along the Kampuchean border. It 
even posed a threat to the sovereignty and independence of the Thai state, which could 
only be removed by challenging Vietnam's assertion of dominance. ASEAN, in 
Thailand's strategic perspective, occupied a significant but subordinate position. ASEAN 
could provide collective diplomatic defense in the international arena, but could not act 
as a countervailing power against Vietnam. The only external power who was willing 'to 
shed blood' on Thailand's behalf was China, providing Thailand with a supply of military 
weapons. 
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However, Thailand's growing reliance toward China was viewed as 
"undesirable" by other ASEAN members, especially Indonesia and Malaysia. For their 
part, Beijing was regarded as a principal source of external threat, due to its support for 
the local communist party and insurgency. The Soviet's presence in the region, was also 
viewed with uneasiness. In their view, the involvement of great powers such as China and 
the Soviet Union would only escalate the conflict as it allowed Sino-Soviet rivalry to 
influence regional affairs. With this in mind, Indonesia and Malaysia independently from 
other members developed a joint proposal as a first step to the Kampuchean conflict 
resolution. The proposal, known as the Kuantan Declaration, was issued in March 1980. 
It was designed to effect an agreement by which Vietnam would cut its ties to the Soviet 
Union while Thailand gave up its reliance on china. In exchange, ASEAN would 
recognize Vietnam's security interests in Indochina. The declaration proved abortive 
however. Thailand strongly rejected it because it conceded Vietnam's entitlement to 
Kampuchea, removing a historic buffer against a traditional enemey. Hanoi also rejected 
the proposal, believing that it could not sustain control over Indochina without the 
Soviet's aid [Ref. 9]. 
It could also be argued that Kuantan was the first attempt by Indonesia to 
restore its leading role in ASEAN's diplomacy. Jakarta was frustrated by the fact that its 
"natural leadership" within the Association had been subordinated to Thailand's need as 
"frontline state" [Ref. 9]. Despite ASEAN's posture to isolate Vietnam from the 
international community, Jakarta continued its approach toward Vietnam. The several 
contacts between Indonesian and Vietnamese officials in 1984 and 1985 reflected 
Jakarta's search for a special Indonesian role in resolving the Kampuchean conflict. 
e. The United States 
Although not directly involved in the conflict, the United States had a 
traditional role as a "balancing wheel" in the region. Its defense ties with some of 
ASEAN members provided deterrence against the threat of other great powers' agression 
in the region. The role as a guarantor had made the United States the only great power 
whose military presence in the region was welcomed by ASEAN states. 
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In the Kampuchean issue, ASEAN had called for greater U.S. action, 
especially in terms of aid to the non-communist party of the Kampuchean government, 
which was supported by ASEAN. However, ASEAN also worried about further 
involvement of the United States in the conflict. ASEAN was concerned that the U.S. 
would become preoccupied with its global rivalry with the Soviet that its role in 
Kampuchean conflict might be viewed in that context. As this might happen, ASEAN 
feared that the U.S. would use the "China card", recognizing China's role in the region 
to fulfill its interests, thus denying those of ASEAN's [Ref. 12]. 
2. ASEAN's Diplomatic Efforts 
Shortly after the invasion, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja 
in his capacity as chairman of the ASEAN standing committee issued a statement on 9 
January 1979 which deplored the Vietnamese action and calling on the U.N. Security 
Council to take immediate action. At an A SEAN Foreign Minister's emergency meeting 
a few days later in Bangkok, this position was endorsed and became the tone for ASEAN-
Vietnam relations in 1980s. [Ref. 2,6] 
When the Kampuchean conflict was brought into the Security Council in January 
1979 at the request of the Pol Pot government, charging Vietnam with an act of agression, 
the Soviet Union exercised its veto. The veto prevented the adoption of a draft resolution 
that would have condemned Vietnam's invasion and demanded the immediate withdrawal 
of all foreign troops from Kampuchea. When the conflict was again taken up by the 
Security Council in March 1979, ASEAN presented its own draft resolution. It called on 
all parties to stop fighting and for foreign troops (i.e., Vitnamese troops) to withdraw 
from Kampuchea and welcomed the offer by the U.N. Secretary General to use his good 
offices in finding a solution to the conflict. Again, the draft was vetoed by the Soviet 
Union. [Ref. 6] 
Undeterred by this defeat, ASEAN took its case to the U.N. General Assembly. 
Despite the opposition by Vietnam and its allies, Kampuchean conflict was included in 
the agenda of the upcoming General Assembly session by a 19 to 5 vote with one 
abstention. In the 34th General Assembly meeting, an ASEAN-sponsored draft resolution, 
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which was virtually the same as the earlier draft that ASEAN had presented to the 
Security Council, was adopted by a vote of 91 to 21, with 29 abstentions. The support for 
the resolution increased annually through the 1980's, making it the de facto U.N. position 
on Kampuchea. [Ref. 61 
Meanwhile, ASEAN's strategy to isolate Vietnam from the world diplomatic 
community continued. The cohesion of ASEAN, which was once at risk with the 
Indonesian and Malaysian joint declaration of Kuantan, was strengthened by the finn 
support of both countries for Thailand after the incursion of Vietnamese troops into 
Thailand in 1980. In July 1981, an International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) was 
held in New York under the auspices of the Secretary General of the United Nations. 
Holding such a conference was a diplomatic success for ASEAN, since a U.N. 
conference had been a persistent demand of the Association in the year following 
Vietnam's invasion. As can be expected, however, Vietnam and its allies boycotted the 
meeting. 
In the middle of its success in the world's diplomacy, ASEAN was faced with 
another problem regarding the Khmer Rouge. So far, ASEAN justified its policy with 
reference to the sanctity of national sovereignty. Vietnam's invasion was illegal because 
it violated the sovereignty of Kampuchea. Therefore, ASEAN' effort was directed towards 
the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. But the fact that the ousted 
Kampuchean government was the Pol Pot regime made the matter more complex. The Pol 
Pot regime of Democratic Kampuchea earned its notorious reputation by killing its own 
people, leaving the rest of the Kampuchean population in fear. Moreover, the surviving 
military arm of Pol Pot regime was the only significant source of internal challenge to 
Vietnam's client government. ASEAN was put into a difficult position since, indirectly, 
its effort in international diplomacy could mean a support for the Khmer Rouge's claim 
for reinstatement. 
As ASEAN was swimming in the dilemma, international support for its diplomatic 
position was qualified and seemed likely to wane. In December 1979, Great Britain 
withdrew its recognition of Democratic Kampuchea, followed by Australia in the 
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following year. In July 1980, India decided to establish diplomatic relations with the Heng 
Samrin government. Forced to find a solution, ASEAN forwarded a proposal for forming 
a coalition among Kampuchean factions. It was hoped that the coalition could serve as 
a political alternative to the Khmer Rouge, with an internal political appeal within 
Kampuchea as well as external one, especially within the U.N. General Assembly. 
The fact that ASEAN governments shared a strong inhibition over supporting a 
communist insurgent movement, even if against a communist administration, did not 
prevent the Khmer Rouge from inclusion into the plan. The reason behind such a decision 
was the dominant role played by the Khmer Rouge in armed resistance to the Vietnamese. 
Therefore, it was logical to try to promote a political alternative to them through a 
coalition arrangement. Other candidates were Prince Sihanouk and the non-communist 
Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), headed by Son Sann. Despite the 
initial resentment by the non-communist factions to work with the Khmer Rouge, they 
finally agreed to form a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), with 
a view to continuing the struggle in all forms for the liberation of Kampuchea from the 
Vietnamese agression. Although the coalition was marked by the fragile nature of the 
bonding between its elements, it served a useful diplomatic purpose, namely to hold the 
Kampuchean seat in the U.N. [Ref. 2]. 
Throughout the 1980s, ASEAN had assumed a prominent political role over the 
Kampuchean conflict, which registered its standing as a diplomatic community. In the late 
1980s, however, the conflict entered a new phase, in which pressure by the Soviets and 
the Sino-Soviet rapprochement had forced Vietnam to seek political settlement in 
Kampuchea, albeit on its own terms. Faced with this opportunity, Indonesia revived its 
role as interlocutor with Vietnam. The softening of the Thais' position, encouraged by 
Soviet assurances, led to a renewed accord on regional talks. So the Jakarta Informal 
Talks (JIM) was convened in July 1988. It was the first occasion on which all 
Kampuchean factions and interested regional governments met. However, the talks made 
no significant progress. Meanwhile, Kampuchea appeared to be discussed more fruitfully 
in Soviet-American and Sino-Soviet talks. At the end of 1988, Kampuchea had been 
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sufficiently set aside as an issue in Sino-Soviet relations for agreement to be reached on 
holding a summit meeting in Beijing in the first half of 1989 [Ref. 2]. This development 
prompted Indonesia and Vietnam to press for a second round of regional talks. Their 
concern was that major power rapprochement might determine a political settlement. 
In January 1989, Vietnam announced a complete withdrawal from Kampuchea in 
the event of a settlement. The statement was renewed in April 1989 that all Vietnamese 
forces would be withdrawn from Kampuchea by the end of September 1989, irrespective 
of any political settlement. ASEAN' s effort in the Kampuchean conflict reached a success 
when Vietnam finally agreed to the terms set by ASEAN, including the complete 
withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea and the replacement of the regime 
installed by its invasion with a new government resulted from a free election. [Ref. 2, 18] 
E. ASEAN AND MAJOR POWERS 
1. Soviet Union-ASEAN Relations 
For the ASEAN states, the Soviet Union was traditionally viewed as a relatively 
distant power. In 1978, however, the Soviets gained a strong position in Southeast Asia 
through their alliance with Vietnam. The treaty allowed the Soviet Union to use Da Nang 
and Cam Ranh Bay military facilities, bringing the Soviets closer to A SEAN's doorstep. 
To some ASEAN states, however, the Soviet Union was still viewed not as a direct and 
immediate threat to their security [Ref. 13]. The reasons were: 
1. Although the Soviet Union maintained its presence in Southeast Asia, they 
did not maintain a high military visibility in the ASEAN region, e.g. by naval 
movements. Furthermore, although Da Nang and Carnh Ranh Bay facilities 
would provide logistics sufficient for Soviet's Pacific Fleet vessels, these 
bases could not repair major battle damage nor provide aircover for Southeast 
Asian operations. In the case of open war, these bases could be rapidly 
rendered inoperative by U.S. forces based in the Philippines or Guam [Ref. 
14]. 
2. Unlike China, the Soviet Union did not develop close relations with any 
insurgent groups within the ASEAN countries. 
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However, this does not mean that the Soviet Union was viewed with sympathy either. 
Distrust had been expressed by ASEAN governments as the result of Soviet espionage 
cases in Southeast Asia [Ref. 13]. 
After Vietnam· s intervention m Kampuchea, Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak 
Chomanand visited Moscow in March 1979, asking for Soviet assurances regarding 
Vietnam· s intention toward Thailand. Any assurances by the Soviets proved short-lived, 
however, as the Vietnamese troops crossed into Thai territory in June 1980, causing a 
political embarrassment in Moscow. The Soviet discomfort with Vietnam's use of force 
was reflected in Moscow's diplomacy soon afterwards as they urged regional discussions 
between ASEAN and the Indochinese to settle the Kampuchean conflict. [Ref. 14] 
In general, the ASEAN governments were concerned about the Soviet presence 
in terms of Sino-Soviet antagonism. As the alliance with Vietnam served Moscow's 
strategy to contain China, ASEAN leaders feared that the larger the Soviet presence 
becomes, the more active China's effort to subvert it will be. Malaysia's Foreign Minister 
Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie warned that Soviet moves to develop its own independent position 
in Laos and Kampuchea "would encourage China to accelerate aid to the resistance 
movements in both countries, thus insuring constant turmoil involving both the Chinese 
and the Russians in territory adjacent to Thailand." [Ref. 14] 
2. People's Republic of China-ASEAN Relations 
China was viewed by the ASEAN states as an actual or potential enemy because 
of its support for local insurgencies and the association of China with overseas Chinese, 
regarded as a potential "fifth column" in many Southeast Asian states. Indonesia broke-off 
its diplomatic relations with China after the 1965 Communist Party coup, which was 
rumored to be supported by China. Malaysia, although it had established diplomatic ties 
with China in 1974, was still troubled by the communist insurgency movement supported 
by China. Singapore, despite its predominantly ethnic Chinese population, stated that it 
will not normalize its relations with China until Indonesia does [Ref. 13]. Thailand and 
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the Philippines were also troubled by communist insurgency movements, which as in the 
case of Thailand, were dominated by overseas Chinese cadres [Ref. 13]. 
After Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea. China became a close ally to ASEAN, 
especially to Thailand. Both China and ASEAN opposed Vietnam and demanded the 
withdrawal of its troops from Kampuchea. However, being together on the same side did 
not mean that both would agree to each other's concept of the conflict settlement. In their 
efforts, the ASEAN states were cautious not to let China be the beneficiary in the event 
of conflict settlement. ASEAN's proposal to disarm all Kampuchean resistance factions 
(in which the Khmer Rouge, supported by China. was the strongest) before a free U.N. 
supervised election could be conducted, was evidence of ASEAN' s fear toward China. 
3. United States-ASEAN Relations 
In general. the United States-ASEAN relations were very good. ASEAN states 
were viewed by the U.S. as a model of what developing countries should be like: non-
communist, trade oriented, relatively stable politically, and engaged in regional 
cooperation [Ref. 13]. ASEAN, in return, viewed the United States as a supportive 
superpower. Although the United States established formal security arrangements with 
only two ASEAN members, Thailand and the Philippines, it was viewed by the ASEAN 
states as the ultimate external security guarantor of their security. 
During the 1980s, the Reagan administration once again viewed the third world 
as a primary arena of competition with the Soviet Union, and insisted that the reassertion 
of American power in the third world is essential for restoring the confidence of friends 
[Ref. 14]. However, the ASEAN states felt that U.S. policy still reflected a tendency 
toward serving only U.S. interests in its global rivalry with the Soviet Union. As in the 
case of U.S. policies in the Kampuchean conflict, the ASEAN states feared that the 
United States would only be interested in improving its relations with China, and 
neglecting ASEAN' s interests. 
The growing Soviet military presence during the 1980s and the prolonged 
Kampuchean conflict led the ASEAN states to seek additional military assistance from 
the United States. Discussions were conducted for the possibility of purchasing modern 
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military equipment, including the F-16 fighter bombers [Ref. 14]. Joint naval maneuvers, 
combining elements of the Seventh Fleet. also engaged naval units from Singapore. 
Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines. 
The United States is important to ASEAN not only because of the security 
guarantee that the United States provided. At the same time, the United States is 
considered as a potential market for ASEAN's goods. Together with the Pacific Basin's 
community, the United States' trade reached $ 136 billion in 1982, the largest of any 
world region [Ref. 14]. Although the ASEAN states still found the trade barriers caused 
by U.S. protectionist policies, dialogue channels have been established through the 
ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, in which the United States has become one of 
ASEAN's Dialogue Partners, together with Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the European 
Community and South Korea. 
4. Japan-ASEAN Relations 
From the Japanese perspective, A SEAN occupied an important position in their 
foreign policy directives. The establishment of A SEAN, for example, was regarded by 
Japan as an illustration of growing Southeast Asian regionalism, thus important to 
Tokyo's regional development strategy. [Ref. 15]. In the early 1970s, however, Japan's 
rapid economic penetration of the Southeast Asian region caused a growing fear of 
Japan's economic domination. On one occasion, A SEAN took a collective action opposing 
Japan's plan to develop synthetic rubber production [Ref. 6]. Japan's Prime Minister 
Kakuei Tanaka's visit to Southeast Asia in early 1974 was then met with anti-Japanese 
demonstrations as the result of Japan's plan. In the event, Japan agreed to establish a 
Japan-ASEAN Forum on Rubber in the same year. 
With the end of the Vietnam War, Japan formulated a policy which was later 
called the Fukuda Doctrine, composed of three principles [Ref. 13, 15]: 
1. Japan would never become a military power. 
2. Japan's relationship with A SEAN would be based on "heart to heart" 
diplomacy. 
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3. Japan would encourage peaceful coexistence between ASEAN and the 
Indochinese countries. 
The Fukuda Doctrine showed the importance of ASEAN in Japan's Southeast Asian 
policy. In March 1977, the Japan-A SEAN Forum was established, indicating Japan's 
intention to pursue a special relationship with ASEAN. 
After Vietnam's invasion to Kampuchea, ASEAN urged Tokyo to use its 
considerable economic power to dissuade Vietnam from agression [Ref. 16]. Japan 
gradually took a firm stand of not resuming economic aid to Vietnam until Vietnam 
withdrew its troops from Kampuchea, and until a comprehensive settlement could be 
achieved. Many Japanese disagreed with their government's support of the ASEAN stance 
on the Kampuchean issue, especially that of Japan's freeze of economic aid to Hanoi 
[Ref. 16]. 
From the Japanese government's perspective, ASEAN was clearly more important 
to Japan than Vietnam. Economically, ASEAN accounted for 10 percent of Japan's total 
trade, while Vietnam and the Indochinese states combined represented less than one 
percent [Ref. 16]. Politically, the ASEAN countries were important to Japan mainly in the 
larger context of the Asia-Pacific region and global strategy. In a scholar's words: 
With their basically anti-communist governments and with economies well 
integrated with the non-communist nations, ASEAN countries are likely 
allies of Japan in the regional balance of power. Their support and 
cooperation would definitely enhance Japan's position in the international 
community while their political stability and friendly disposition would 
guarantee Japan the accessibility to its most vital line, the Straits of 
Malacca. [Ref. 16] 
In the security dimension, some ASEAN countries have shown interest in 
receiving arms and military technology from Japan in order to bolster their own defense 
capabilities and to enhance regional security, but Japan refused to sell military hardware 
to any nation [Ref. 13, 16]. Japan, however, accepted the requests for education and 
training of military personnel from the region. Between 1975 and 1985, 128 foreign 
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students attended Japan's military school, of which 80 were from Singapore and Thailand 
I Ref. 161. In the context of Japan-ASEAN security cooperation, the Japanese government 
has repeatedly insisted that Japan would engage in "security-related cooperation" with 
ASEAN countries only in the economic field [Ref. 161. They emphasized the importance 
of Japan's contribution to stability in Southeast asia through its economic role, rather than 
by means of direct military assistance. 
F. A DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY AND THE ASIAN WAY 
Ever since Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea, ASEAN has been widely known 
as a diplomatic community. Its efforts at the U.N. to isolate Vietnam showed the 
Association's utility as a diplomatic tool to its member states in pursuing their individual 
as well as collective interests. Yet, while the Kampuchean conflict is perhaps the most 
widely known, ASEAN's utility as a diplomatic tool could be traced back to much earlier 
cases. 
In an early 1970s case for example, ASEAN expressed their strong concerns to 
Japan over Japan's plan to increase both its domestic use and production of synthetic 
rubber. In response to ASEAN's pressure, Japan agreed to set up a forum on synthetic 
rubber through which a number of arrangements for assistance in technical and marketing 
research on natural rubber and rubber products were made [Ref. 6]. Japan also expressed 
its willingness to ensure that the development and expansion of its own domestic 
production of synthetic rubber would not unfavorably affect the natural rubber market 
In another case, ASEAN rallied behind Singapore on the dispute with Australia 
over a new Australian International Civil Aviation Policy. The new policy would restrict 
the ability of ASEAN states' airlines to pick up passengers in mid-route. Although the 
dispute was really between Singapore and Australia as the other airlines were still too 
small to be immediately affected, ASEAN viewed the dispute in the broader context of 
developed countries changing the rules to the disadvantage of developing countries [Ref. 
6]. These examples emphasizes two important principles in ASEAN's diplomacy, which 
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are: the value of presenting a united front against a third party, and the utility of agreeing 
to line up behind the most threatened member [Ref. 6]. 
In his book, The Asian Way to Peace [Ref. 17], Michael Haas described the 
philosophy of Asian cultures which to a great deal unsurprisingly explained the behavioral 
pattern in ASEAN's decision making. It consists of six principles, which are: 
1. Asian Solutions to Asian Problems 
This principle means that Asians prefer to solve their own problems in their 
own way, rather than inviting Western countries to proffer advice about 
policies concerning national development and international conflict. 
2. Equality of Cultures 
This principle emphasizes a spirit of tolerance and parmership, that contrasts 
sharply with the concept of domination and subjection that typified the 
imperialist powers in their dealing with Asian people. It is also in this context 
that it is necessary for Asians to develop personal relationship with one 
another in order to develop a mutual trust, from which agreement become 
possible. 
3. Consensus Decision Making 
Related to the equality principle, it is then understood that a decision is the 
outcome of a consensus, a flexible accomodation of opposites that is built 
gradually on the basis of what all parties can endorse. This differs from the 
Western tendency toward rigid confrontation of divergent positions followed 
by a compromise. In the Asian Way, no decision is made unless each party 
can support the decision in principle. Furthermore, the Asian Way is grounded 
in the belief that no majority has the right to rule or shame anyone. 
4. Informal Incrementalism 
In this principle, goals are achieved most effectively through small steps 
rather than by drawing up grand blueprints or timetables. Government should 
proceed with caution. Care is necessary in order to secure a solid political 
backing throughout each stage of a project. 
5. Primary of Politics over Administration 
Matters of implementation are separated from matters of principle. As in the 
case of ASEAN' s concept of the Neutralization of Southeast Asia, diplomats 
obtain a commitment to abstract goals first, leaving questions regarding the 
feasibility of putting lofty ideals into practice as a matters to be left out of 
political discussions. Implementation is assigned to administrative 
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subordinates, who are not supposed to throttle the attainment of political 
objectives. 
6. Pan Asian Spirit 
It is this Pan Asian spirit that allows wide latitude for subregional efforts. It 
is not aimed against any state or group of states, but instead is based on the 
notion of gotong-royong, an Indonesian term for collective self help at the 
local level. 
These principles, in sum, reflected the reversal of an axiom of how the Westerners might 
handle public policy matters. It should not be a strange fact, however, since the principles 
of the Asian Way were developed in the years after World War II, as Western 
colonization began to fade out and Asian leaders were able to deal directly with one 
another. In their experience. the Asian leaders gradually learned that the Western system 
could not be applied satisfactorily in the Asian context. Looking inward to the traditional 
process of conflict resolution, the Asian leaders invented or rediscovered, and then 
developed "the Asian Way" to be adapted to the contemporary world. 
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IV. ASEAN IN THE POST -COLD WAR ERA 
A. POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT: A NEW REGIONAL DISORDER? 
The end of the cold war and superpower rivalries resulted in the reduction of 
global tensions and the settlement of regional conflicts at the international level. Despite 
all these, regional policy makers are also aware about the strategic uncertainties and 
conflict-creation potential of a post-cold war order at the regional level. In the case of 
Southeast Asia, the end of US-Soviet and Sino-Soviet rivalries was marked by major 
retrenchment in the superpower military presence in the region, which in turn affecting 
the balance of power. 
In January 1990, the former Soviet Union announced its intention to remove all 
but a small segment of its naval and air units stationed in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. For 
some ASEAN states, especially Indonesia and Malaysia, the Soviet withdrawal from 
Vietnam means the disappearing of a useful counterweight against any China's intention 
to gain supremacy in Southeast Asia [Ref. 18]. In addition, the reduction of Soviet forces 
along the Sino-Soviet border and the significant build up of Chinese naval power were 
viewed as effectively enhanced Beijing's capability to dominate the regional maritime 
environment [Ref. 19]. 
The United States on the other side, also decided to scale down its own military 
presence in the Pacific and reduce the stakes in its bases in the Philippines, thereby 
undermining its role as the regional "balancing wheel". These decisions by the United 
States raised concerns among ASEAN states, despite repeated U.S. statements 
emphasizing its intention to remain as a Pacific military power with significant forward-
deployed forces. The impact of the reduction on U.S. military readiness and force-
projection capability in the region remains uncertain [Ref. 18]. 
The absence of great powers such as the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the region 
would also mean a possible scramble by regional powers seeking to step into the power 
vacuum. Among the regional powers, China, Japan and India to some extent, are generally 
identified as the three leading contenders for influence, presumably because of their 
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capability to project power into Southeast Asian region [Ref. 20]. Apart from the question 
of who might be come the regional hegemon, the rivalries among those countries will 
certainly boost competition which in turn make a multipolar regional order much less 
stable than the bipolar cold war system. 
A potential scenario in which Japan and China will be forced to play greater roles 
in the region is in part determined by both countries relationship with the United States. 
Serious escalation in the trade dispute between the United States and Japan for example, 
could threaten the fate of the US-Japan security relationship. Similarly, friction between 
the United States and China over the issue of human rights and Washington's threat of 
economic sanctions against China would make China "angry and resentful", which will 
have "serious long term consequences for Asia-Pacific peace and stability." [Ref. 18]. 
Another concerns among ASEAN leaders are a number of recent developments, 
especially the conflicting claims to islands in the South China Sea [Ref. 9, 18, 21] as well 
as intramural territorial disputes within ASEAN [Ref. 18]. These are viewed as signalling 
a new phase of regional disorder. Moreover, a large scale arms build up that occurs 
within ASEAN as a result of intramural suspicions and an uncertain strategic climate 
caused by the retrenchment of superpower forces has led a former governor of Indonesia's 
National Defense Institute to warn of the possibility that Southeast Asia might become 
the theater of "prolonged, low intensity conflicts without directly involving strong 
nations", replacing larger conflicts fuelled by superpower rivalry during the cold war [Ref. 
18]. 
B. SECURITY ISSUES OF ASEAN 
Security concerns among ASEAN states are shifting as a result of the end of the 
cold war. In the past, internal security issues such as communist insurgency, ethnic 
separation, political dissidence and civil-military conflicts preoccupied the minds of 
ASEAN ruling authorities. Internal threat was arguably more pressing than external ones. 
In fact, many of the so-called external threats, such as superpower rivalry, communist 
victories in Indochina and the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea were perceived mainly 
46 
in terms of their potential to aggravate existing domestic strife [Ref. 2, 14, 18]. In the 
post-cold war context, however. interstate and external security issues have become 
important on their own. Also. the question of internal security in many ASEAN states is 
now defined in terms of its external and international implications, such as human right 
issues, which are linked to the suppression of internal dissents and separatist movements 
by ASEAN's ruling regimes [Ref. 18]. 
Security cooperation between ASEAN members is also experiencing a change. 
During the cold war, the notion of "common enemy", i.e., communist insurgency, helped 
not only to dampen interstate rivalry within ASEAN, but also led member governments 
to develop cooperative security relationships short of a formal alliance [Ref. 18]. With the 
diminishing threat of communism, A SEAN now faces other problems of ethnic separatism 
and tenitorial disputes, which have a divisive impact on relationships both within the 
grouping and within the region as a whole. A new security approach is needed to deal 
with these issues, different from the one when insurgency and subversion were deemed 
to be the principal threat. 
1. Issues of Internal Threat and Domestic Stability 
a. Communist Insurgency 
The role of communism as a revolutionary political force has declined in 
most ASEAN member states. With the exception of the Philippines, communist 
insurgency no longer poses a credible threat to regime survival in ASEAN states. In 
Indonesia, the communist party was never allowed to recover from its bloody crackdown 
in the aftermath of the 1965 coup attempt. In Malaysia and Thailand, amnesty campaigns 
launched by both governments led to a rapid decline in the number of communist 
guerillas. The pro-Beijing Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) shrank to a few hundred 
members in 1987, from a peak of 10,000 guerillas in the late 1970's. Malaysia also 
witnessed the surrender of 1,100 strong guerilla army of the Communist Party of Malaya 
(CPM). The peak strength of CPM had been recorded as 8,000 members in 1951. In 
December 1989, agreement was made between Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and 
the governments of Malaysia and Thailand, ending the 41-year armed struggle against the 
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Malaysian government [Ref. 19]. In the Philippines, members of the New People's Army 
had swollen during the last years of President Marcos regime, from around 8,000 in 1980 
to about 22,500 in 1985. Recent estimates suggest a number of 15,000. [Ref. 18] 
Several factors can be attributed to the succes of ASEAN governments over 
communist insurgencies. The decline of external support, especially from China, was 
especially important in the succes against the communists in Malaysia and Thailand. Also 
the ability of the government to ensure rapid economic growth and prosperity was 
important in eliminating the domestic roots of insurgency. In the Philippines, the 
government is adopting a new strategy called total programming in which a military 
campaign is combined with efforts by local government authorities, civilian volunteers 
and the private sector to address the insurgents' livelihood problems. The removal of U.S. 
bases and forces from the Philippines are also hoped to reduce support for the insurgents, 
since it deprived a major reason for their popular appeal. [Ref. 18] 
b. The Anned Separatist Movements 
Another internal security concern within ASEAN states is the armed 
separatist movements. Organisasi Papua Merdeka, Aceh Merdeka and Fretilin in 
Indonesia, Moro National Liberation Front and Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the 
Philippines, and the Pattani United Liberation Organization in Southern Thailand are those 
who remain active, albeit varying degree in intensity. In general, however, these armed 
separatist campaigns have not posed as great a threat to stability as communist 
insurgency. The major reason for this is the lack of significant external support for 
separatist causes. This, along with effective suppression and or more accomodationist 
government policies, has led to a decline in separatist movements in ASEAN states in 
recent years. 
c. Civil-Military Relations 
As in the case of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, the state of civil-
military relations has been and remains a crucial factor in regime stability, although the 
nature and scope of military influence is not uniform in these states. In Indonesia, the 
doctrine of dwifungsi or dual function of the armed forces allows the military to intervene 
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m the country's politics whenever deemed necessary to preserve social and political 
stability. The doctrine stated the role of ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) as the country's 
defense force and as a social political force. The role as a social political force was 
derived from historical perspective that ABRI was essentially the freedom fighters who 
fought for and defended Indonesian independence. Thus, ABRI is part of a large 
Indonesian national community with the same rights and responsibility as any other 
citizens. As a manifestation of the dwifungsi doctrine, Indonesia's armed forces remain 
deeply entrenched in a wide variety of state institutions, especially those dealing with 
political, legal and security affairs [Ref. 18, 22, 23]. 
In Thailand and the Philippines, the military's intervention in politics was 
driven by the failures of the civilian government in the political and economic arena. 
Issues of corruption and inefficiency were among the major reasons for a military 
intervention. But political trends in both countries seem to show increasing constraints on 
the military's coup-making potential [Ref. 18]. The bloody suppression of a May 1992 
demonstration in Thailand, which led to the resignation of army commander Suchinda 
Krapayoon as prime minister, signalled some fundamental changes in Thai society that 
might militate against future coup. The rapid economic growth fuelled by foreign 
investment is the prime cause for the shift. A coup or an attempted coup might cause 
political instability, which will drive away foreign investors and undermine economic 
growth. For this reason, the middle class and business groups in Thailand oppose military 
intervention in politics. A successful future coup in Thailand thus, in order to have public 
support, would require a strategy of hitherto untried approaches that combine seizure of 
power with methods to sustain business confidence. [Ref. 18] 
In the Philippines, issues of widespread corruption and economic decline 
during Marcos era have also created a popular revulsion with military rule. Army officers 
of the ultra right forces are now in a minority and find fewer opportunities to stage a 
coup. Except when allied with other traditional conservative groups, the dissident military 
groups are unlikely to gain popular backing for their cause. As also in the case of 
Thailand, the military establishment in the Philippines has to face the fact that they are 
49 
no longer monolithic as a political organization, with interservice squabbles having 
undermined its cohesion and ability to dominate the political system. [Ref. 18] 
2. Intra-ASEAN Territorial Disputes 
In the post cold war era, a number of territorial disputes have surfaced and 
assumed significance for the potential to disrupt intra-ASEAN relations. The following 
are the existing disputes between A SEAN member states [Ref. 18]: 
a. Malaysia and Singapore 
Pedra Branca island off the coast of Johor is disputed. Singapore claims 
the island on the basis that it has exercised control since 1840's. Singapore, in fact, has 
been responsible for the operation of the lighthouse on the island. Malaysia, on the other 
hand, stated that the island belongs to the state of Johor. An arbitration proposed by 
Singapore in 1989 to settle the dispute has not materialized yet. Tensions occur over the 
issues of a helicopter pad built by Singapore on the lighthouse and the chasing away of 
Malaysian fishermen by the Singapore Navy. 
b. Malaysia and Indonesia 
Sipadan and Ligitan islands in the Sulawesi Sea near Sabah-Kalimantan 
border are the center of the dispute. Both claims are based on maps created during the 
Dutch and British colonial administrations in Indonesia and Malaysia respectively. 
Attempts by Malaysia to develop tourist fascilities on the islands in 1991 invited protest 
from Indonesia. A joint committee has been formed to settle the dispute. 
c. Malaysia and Thailand 
There is a dispute over border-crossing rights. A treaty which allowed Thai 
and Malaysian military personnel to conduct cross-border operations was signed between 
both countries. But an incident in December 1991 in which Thai forces fired shots at 
Padang Besar area (Malaysia) led Malaysia to accuse Thailand of abusing the provisions 
of the treaty for frequent intrusion. An effort is being made to develop a consultative 
mechanism to deal with future incident. 
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d. Malaysia and Brunei 
The dispute over the Limbang territory in Sarawak remains unresolved. 
Originally, Limbang was a territory under the sultanate of Brunei. In 1890, the chiefs of 
Limbang, which had been in a state of rebellion against the Sultan of Brunei, asked 
Sarawak ruler Raja Brooke to take over their district. Limbang was then incorporated as 
the fifth division of Sarawak. This deprived Brunei of a valuable food-producing area. 
The British government offered to pay compensation to the Sultan, but the offer was 
never formally accepted, so that this came to be regarded as a cession by default. In 1916, 
the United Kingdom formally recognized Limbang as part of Sarawak, but the Sultan of 
Brunei never acknowledged the cession, and the status of Limbang remained 
controversial. 
e. Malaysia and the Philippines 
Long term dispute over Sabah was regarded as the most dangerous bilateral 
dispute within ASEAN. Although it is now considerably muted since President Marcos 
dropped the claim at the 1977 ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, final resolution has not 
yet been reached. Attempts by the Aquino government to secure the necessary legal basis 
for dropping the claim was thwarted by the Philippine Senate. 
3. The Spratly Islands Dispute 
The Spratly Islands group is located in the southern part of the South China Sea. 
It consists of over 230 islets, reefs, shoals and sand banks. The parties involved in the 
dispute are China, Taiwan, Vietnam and three ASEAN members: Brunei, Malaysia and 
the Philippines [Ref. 9, 18, 21]. The Philippines is claiming some 60 islets, rocks and 
atolls collectively called Kalayaan. Malaysia's total claim includes three islands and four 
group of rocks. Brunei only claims the Laisa Reef [Ref. 18]. 
Within ASEAN members, Malaysia and the Philippines have established a military 
presence in the Spratlys. Malaysia put its troops on three atolls since 1983 and is planning 
to build an airstrip to defend the islands. The Philippines' military presence dates back 
to 1968 and currently occupies eight of the islands, with an airstrip on one of them. [Ref. 
18] 
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Security concerns about the Spratly disputes are linked to the potential of 
becoming a source of armed conflict in Southeast Asia. But it is noteworthy citing the 
fact that the non-ASEAN parties to the dispute have adopted a generally more moderate 
attitude towards the ASEAN claimants than towards each other. China has shown a 
degree of restraint in dealing with Malaysia's and the Philippines' claims. Taiwan. too, 
has shown similar posture, despite the strain on the bilateral relation with the Philippines 
over the issue of Taiwanese fishermen on the Philippine's water. Hanoi showed 
willingness for a peaceful settlement with the Philippines and agreed with Malaysia to do 
joint development of the areas under dispute and share any discoveries pending final 
settlement. [Ref. 18] 
But the prospect of any agreement on the joint development of the islands 
involving all the claimants has limited plausibility. Obstacles include Beijing's objection 
to any negotiation involving Taiwan, the unlikely prospect that any of the claimants who 
already have a military presence on the islands would agree to a withdrawal, and 
problems in deciding the principles for the fair allocation of rights and profit. [Ref. 18] 
When the prospect for joint development fails, the fear for armed conflict over the 
islands arises. As the armed forces commander of the Philippines, General Lisandro 
Abadia put it: "There are strong indications that the future area of conflict (in Southeast 
Asia) may shift towards the maritime area, specifically the territorial dispute of the South 
China Sea." [Ref. 18]. A major factor behind such concern is the economic and strategic 
importance of the Spratlys. Economically, the Spratlys are believed to be rich in oil and 
other minerals, such as manganese nodules, as well as in fishing grounds [Ref. 9, 18]. 
Strategically, the Spratly islands are located near major sea-lanes in Eastern Asia. Control 
of the island group could provide a country with staging points for surveillance, sea-lane 
interdiction and other naval operations that could disrupt traffic from Singapore to 
Southern China and Taiwan [Ref. 18]. 
In February 1992, China adopted a territorial sea law which claimed the entire 
Spratlys and provided for the use of force to back its claim [Ref. 18, 21]. This was 
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followed by the awarding of a three-year contract to an American company to begin oil 
exploration in the South China Sea in an area just 160 km from the Vietnamese coast. 
The perceived strategic importance of the Spratlys and a desire to prevent the 
South China Sea from becoming the next focal point of conflict in the region occupied 
the main agenda of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila 1992. The meeting produced 
an ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, which stressed the "necessity to resolve 
all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful 
means, without resort to force", and urged "all parties concerned to exercise restraint." In 
this context, ASEAN is successful in bringing the South China Sea dispute to 
international attention and implying a diplomatic cost for any party which may 
contemplate military action to settle the dispute. But this may be as far as ASEAN can 
go, given its lack of leverage on the major actor in the dispute, China. [Ref. 18] 
C. ASEAN AND INDOCHINA 
1. A New Relationship 
In 1986, the ruling Communist Party of Vietnam adopted an economic policy of 
doi moi or renovation. The policy had the objective of creating a market mechanism 
economy with the help of foreign investment and export promotion. Apparently Hanoi 
realized that its occupation of Kampuchea entailed severe economic costs that it could no 
longer afford. However, the initiative by Vietnamese government to improve the political 
climate for economic ties with its neighbors was not accepted by the ASEAN members 
in the first place. Instead, A SEAN chose to focus on Hanoi's continued occupation of 
Kampuchea. [Ref. 2, 18] 
In August 1988, a major shift took place in Thailand when Prime Minister 
Chatichai Choonhavan recognized the opportunities offered by Vietnam's reform by 
declaring that Thai policy would now aim at "turning the Indochinese battlefields into 
marketplaces." [Ref. 2, 18]. Immediately reactions came from other ASEAN members. 
Not only was Bangkok accused of seeking unilateral economic advantage by promoting 
rapid trade and investment links with Indochina, but Chatichai' s political initiatives on 
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the Kampuchean conflict undermined ASEAN's consensual diplomacy, in which not a 
single ASEAN country is justified to make a commitment directed to help Vietnam before 
a comprehensive settlement has been found to the Kampuchean problem. 
Against this backdrop, Hanoi declared on 5 April 1989 that it would 
unconditionally withdraw all its troops from Kampuchea by September in the same year. 
ASEAN on the other hand, chose to wait for clear proof of Hanoi's sincerity in making 
good its promise before pronouncing an end to the regional rivalry. Meanwhile, doubts 
and differing views over improved relations with Indochina persisted throughout 1990. 
On the question of Vietnam becoming a partner in A SEAN's menbership upon the 
withdrawal of its troops from Kampuchea, opinions among ASEAN members were 
divided. Malaysia and Indonesia adopted the view that such a development should not 
await domestic transformation in Vietnam. In Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir words: 
"If Vietnam subscribes to the ideas of ASEAN, the system of government it practices 
should not be something that stands in the way of becoming a member of ASEAN." [Ref. 
18]. Singapore on the other hand, stated that the Indochinese countries should change 
their economic and political systems before being allowed into the Association [Ref. 18]. 
Despite the cold reactions by some ASEAN members, Hanoi continued its effort 
to improve the climate for ASEAN-Indochinese relations. From Hanoi's perspective, the 
relations offered a number of benefits, including the prospect for attracting foreign 
investment and technology transfers and reducing its indep~ndence on the Soviet Union. 
The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, marked by Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to 
Beijing in May 1989, had contributed to Hanoi's sense of isolation. Vietnam could no 
longer count on Soviet backing against China. The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from 
Vietnam and the cessation of Soviet material assistance to Vietnam estimated at $ 3 
billion a year had also added to Hanoi's insecurity. 
ASEAN's posture toward Vietnam took a positive tum after Hanoi expressed its 
desire to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which is considered as the regional 
"code of conduct" on territorial integrity and the peaceful resolution of disputes. In part, 
the decline of the Soviet-Vietnam alliance and the departure of most of the Soviet forces 
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from Cam Ranh Bay helped remove ASEAN's long standing suspicions about the threat 
it posed to the security of the regional sea-lanes. 
Similar to the case of Vietnam. the Laotian communist regime launched domestic 
economic reform in order to ensure its own survival and legitimacy in the face of a 
declining economy and reduced prospects of aid from the Eastern bloc countries. In this 
context, its economic links (largely unofficial) with Thailand were now deemed to play 
a crucial role in the success of domestic economic reform. The withdrawal of Vietnamese 
combat units in Laos from 45,000 at the beginning of 1988 to some 5,000 in 1989 
contributed to the rapid improvement in the relationship between Thailand and Laos. In 
November 1989, Thailand lifted the ban on the export of strategic goods to Laos, 
followed by a decision to construct the first bridge across the Mekong River in March 
1990. [Ref. 18] 
But Thailand was not the only non-communist state with whom the regime in Laos 
sought an improved relationship. To prevent over-reliance on a single country, Laos also 
developed closer economic and political ties with other ASEAN states and non-regional 
aid donors. This move was also helpful to dampen Vietnamese fears of a Thai sphere of 
influence in Indochina [Ref. 18]. 
The end of the Kampuchean conflict and the signing of Paris Peace Agreement 
on 23 October 1991 marked another stage in ASEAN-Indochina relations. The agreement 
was a success of ASEAN's diplomatic effort. It conformed to terms set by ASEAN from 
the very outset, including the reversal of the Vietnamese occupation and the replacement 
of the regime installed by its invasion. Following the Paris Agreement was Vietnamese 
Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet' s tour to all A SEAN states, undertaken between October 
1991 and March 1992. Vietnam's effort to cultivate harmonious relationship with ASEAN 
paid-off with the communique issued at the end of the Singapore Summit. It envisaged 
that "ASEAN shall forge a closer relationship based on friendship and cooperation with 
the Indochinese countries, following the settlement on Kampuchea." [Ref. 18]. 
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2. A New Marketplace 
The improving relations with Indochinese countries have the primary impact on 
the economic arena. Singapore has become Vietnam's largest trading partner, with total 
trade amounting to $ 1 billion in 1991. Also about 70 percent of Kampuchea's imports 
come from Singapore, valued at$ 243 million in 1991. In the case of Thailand, its trade 
with Vietnam rose sharply from 350 million baht in 1988 to 2863 million baht in 1990. 
With Kampuchea, the trade jumped from 0.2 million baht in 1987 to 318 million baht in 
1990. Thailand's trade with Laos also increased from 1184 million baht in 1987 to 2817 
million baht in 1990. And finally, trade between Vietnam and Malaysia has also showed 
sharp increases from $ 150 million in 1990 to $ 250 million in 1991. [Ref. 18] 
Rich in natural and human resource base, Vietnam and other Indochinese countries 
are an attractive target for investments. ASEAN countries as a whole had invested $ 31 
million in Vietnam in 1990. In Laos, Thailand is a major ASEAN investor with a total 
of $ 17.2 million in 1990. After lifting its official ban on its companies investing in 
Vietnam in November 1991, Singapore invested some $ 20 million into more than ten 
projects during the first quarter of 1992 only. In Kampuchea, Singapore is also investing 
an equal amount of dollars into some thirty projects. [Ref. 18] 
Undoubtedly, ASEAN has benefited from the economic reconstruction of 
Indochina. And indeed, ASEAN has now emerged as one of the major trading partners 
for the Indochina states. To some extent however, the economic reconstruction of 
Indochina can be a mixed blessing for ASEAN. With a population of 68 million and adult 
literacy reportedly higher than that of ASEAN states, Vietnam could compete with 
ASEAN for increasingly scarce foreign investment capital. 
One of the important topics on the current ASEAN economic agenda is the plan 
for creating an ASEAN Free Trade Area or AFT A. This plan of economic liberalization 
in the region is supposed to take effect by the year 2008. But despite all their enthusiasm 
for developing trade and investment links with Indochina and the prospect of Indochina 
as a potential market, ASEAN states do not envisage participation by the Indochinese 
states in AFT A. AFT A was designed to cover A SEAN member states only. On the 
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prospect of the Indochinese states becoming members of ASEAN, Singapore's Trade 
Minister Lee Hsien Loong listed a number of obstacles (in the case of Vietnam), 
including "differing economic management styles, living standards and integration into 
the world economy." [Ref.l8]. Thus, it seems that accelerated economic development in 
Indochina supported by the continued commitment of the Vietnamese leadership to market 
oriented reform remains an essential precondition of ASEAN-Indochinese economic 
relations. In the meantime, the major contribution of ASEAN-Indochinese economic 
relations has been to act as a catalyst for political relations and improve the general 
climate for a security framework for the entire region. 
3. A New Security Partner? 
In recent years. ASEAN witnessed the change in Hanoi's security perspective. 
Until recently, Hanoi's approach to security was based on the old conception which 
advocated that a country should stand with one great power to oppose another one or 
neighboring countries. This approach conflicted with ASEAN's concept of ZOPFAN, 
which called for regional non-alignment. The new security approach of Hanoi is described 
by Assistant Foreign Minister Tran Huy Chung as: "What is most beneficial to the 
Southeast Asian countries is to have appropriately balanced relationships with great 
powers outside the region, with a view to resolving disputes for influence between them 
over the region." [Ref. 18]. It implicitly indicated Hanoi's need for a regional balance of 
power to offset the perceived threat of Chinese domination. Hanoi's approach however, 
seemed consistent with ASEAN's recent move to favor a balanced relationship among 
external powers to prevent any single regional power from filling the power vacuum 
created by superpower retrenchment. 
The recent Chinese policy in the South China Sea has created a common fear 
shared by Vietnam and ASEAN. ASEAN's call for the parties involved to renounce the 
use of force, which appeared to have been largely directed at China, was openly 
welcomed by Vietnam. The "threat from China" is what Hanoi hopes to find common 
ground with its ASEAN counterpart, especially Indonesia and Malaysia, who hold deep 
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suspicions of China· s naval build-up and its potential to use force in the South China Sea 
dispute [Ref. 18. 19]. 
But it is less likely that the process of ASEAN-Indochinese reconciliation is to be 
governed by a common security imperative than by functional cooperation featuring an 
incremental and modest approach to institution building. Moreover, a number of factors 
have been obstacles for a full fledged security partnership between ASEAN and 
Indochina. The trends toward higher levels of defense spending and force modernization 
in ASEAN states have invited Vietnam's critics. Singapore's offer of a military facility 
to the United States has also created Vietnam's suspicion. Within ASEAN, the Thai 
military remains suspicious of Vietnam· s strategic intentions, despite the pragmatic 
approach of both countries to bilateral relations. [Ref. 18] 
The developments in Kampuchea's internal affairs also have the potential to 
disrupt the process of regional reconciliation between A SEAN and Indochinese countries. 
The May 1993 election in Kampuchea, supervised by the U.N., did not bring about a 
comprehensive political solution as envisaged by the Paris Agreement. The refusal of the 
Khmer Rouge to disarm, as well as its boycott of the election, suggested its determination 
to continue to seek power by exploiting issues of economic problems and the presence 
of ethnic Vietnamese in Kampuchea. Failure by the new regime to create a viable 
constitutional process and ensure economic development might lead to renewed civil war 
in the country. Prosecution of ethnic Vietnamese in Kampuchea might as well invite 
Vietnam to intervene. 
D. APPROACHES AND PROBLEMS TOWARD A NEW REGIONAL 
SECURITY ORDER 
1. Is ZOPFAN Still Relevant? 
Consistent with the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 to ensure the region's stability 
and security from external interference in. any form or manifestation, ZOPF AN reflected 
the grouping's desire to insulate the region from the dynamics of great power rivalry. As 
it turned out, however, the implementation of ZOPFAN was seriously undermined by 
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several factors. First. disagreement occured among A SEAN members over how ZOPF AN 
should be approached. Singapore and Thailand stressed the need for external security links 
as opposed to the pro-neutralization views of Malaysia and Indonesia. Also, ASEAN 
failed to secure support for it from the key extra regional powers, the U.S. and Japan. But 
more importantly, the outbreak of the Kampuchean conflict accompanied by Sino-Soviet 
rivalry led ASEAN to hold on to the position that the realization of ZOPFAN could only 
come after the resolution of the Kampuchean conflict. 
As the Kampuchean conflict came to an end with the signing of the Paris 
Agreement and new developments occur in regional and global events, the circumstances 
which shaped the need for ZOPF AN as a security framework have begun to change 
significantly. Questions on its continued relevance have also emerged. Is ZOPFAN still 
a practical notion? Is ZOPFAN desirable as a framework for regional security and order? 
Those who argue for the non-practicability of ZOPF AN state that it is almost 
impossible to insulate Southeast Asia as a region from the interests and interactions of 
major external powers. Moreover, the facts suggest that ZOPFAN has never been, and is 
unlikely to be accepted by outside powers. Even if ZOPFAN is accepted by the major 
powers, a neutral Southeast Asia would require Southeast Asian countries to maintain an 
insular security posture while at the same time exploiting the pay-offs of closer economic 
interdependence within the wider Asia-Pacific region where four major powers of the 
world are located, which is quite a contradiction in nature. 
The absence of the super power forces from the region has also created a sense 
of vulnerability among some ASEAN states. Led by Singapore, they argue for the need 
to retain the "balancing wheel" role of the United States in the region. Constraining the 
role of outside powers as prescribed by ZOPFAN, in Singapore's view, would suit the 
designs of regional power, including Indonesia, to play a dominant role in the region [Ref. 
18]. ZOPFAN would thus not only undermine the balance of power among external 
players, but would also upset the delicate equilibrium in intra-regional relations which has 
sustained ASEAN for so long. 
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Does this mean that ASEAN is ready to abandon its ZOPFAN concept? Indonesia 
is clearly reluctant to do so. ZOPFAN, in Indonesia's Foreign Minister Ali Alatas' view, 
is "an evolutionary process", representing "the regionaL multilateral framework within 
which it is hoped to promote national and regional resilience and to seek the 
disentanglement of the region from the contending strategic designs of the great powers." 
[Ref. 18]. However, Indonesia is also aware that the implementation of ZOPFAN in its 
original form is not a feasible response to the challenge of the post-cold war regional 
order. Adjustments need to be made in the light of a changing regional strategic 
environment. As Ali Alatas conceded, Southeast Asian countries "cannot keep the four 
powers (the U.S., Japan, China and the former Soviet Union) out of the region." [Ref. 18]. 
The implication is that regional security would best be ensured not through a framework 
excluding the great powers as envisaged by ZOPF AN, but through equilibrium among 
them and between them and Southeast Asia. 
2. Growing External Security Links: Searching for a New Equilibrium? 
The end of the cold war, followed by a major retrenchment in the superpower 
military presence in Southeast Asia, have influenced ASEAN's security perspective. 
Concerns about a possible scramble by regional powers to seek dominance in the region, 
as suggested by the theory of "power vacuum", have contributed to the increasing degree 
in external security links among ASEAN members, especially with the United States. The 
removal of U.S. military bases from the Philippines has encouraged other ASEAN states, 
including Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia, to increase their defense cooperation 
with the United States. 
In November 1990, Singapore signed a memorandum of understanding with the 
U.S. which provided for the deployment of American aircraft (on a rotational basis) and 
military personnel in Singapore. This was followed by an agreement signed during U.S. 
President George Bush's visit to Singapore in 1992, in which a major naval logistic 
facility will be relocated from Subic Bay to Singapore. The facility, known as the 
Command Task Force 73, consists of about 200 personnel and would be responsible for 
port calls and the resupply of U.S. Navy ships and would coordinate warships 
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deployments in the Pacific region. Malaysia has declared its intention to expand bilateral 
military cooperation with the U.S. and has also offered Subang and Lumut fascilities for 
the maintenance and repair of U.S. C-130 aircrafts and ships respective! y, on a 
commercial basis. A similar offer has also been made by Indonesia which allows U.S. 
Navy ships to be repaired at Surabaya facility. Brunei, although limited in scope, has also 
signed a memorandum allowing for several U.S. warship visits and joint training with 
Bruneian forces. [Ref. 18] 
Meanwhile, efforts have also been made to strengthen the role of the Five Power 
Defense Arrangements (FPDA) [Ref. 18, 19], whose members include Malaysia, 
Singapore, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Singapore has proposed a 
contingency command mechanism within FPDA which will enable "FPDA forces to work 
together, so that should the need ever arise and should the political will ever direct, the 
FPDA member countries can combine their military forces together to deal with any 
threat." FPDA so far, has contributed to the air defense of Malaysia and Singapore 
through the Integrated Air Defense System (lADS). In addition, FPDA has helped to serve 
as a highly useful confidence building mechanism between Malaysia and Singapore, 
despite the problems in their political relations. For these reasons, Malaysia and Singapore 
would like to see FPDA strengthened. Recent moves include the expansion of lADS to 
cover Sabah and Sarawa.k as well, and the possibility to attract Brunei into membership. 
Indonesia however, has expressed its uneasiness to any further effort to expand the role 
for FPDA. [Ref. 18] 
Despite the increasing degree of external security links among ASEAN member 
states, they maintain that their moves do not imply the abandonement of ZOPFAN, 
especially as the new relationships do not permit foreign "bases", but only "access to local 
facilities". [Ref. 18]. But the greater tolerance for such arrangements suggests ASEAN's 
shift towards a new security approach that does not necessarily seek to minimize the 
involvement of external power. As this happen, it might lead to the obsolescence of 
ZOPFAN as a framework for regional security. 
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3. Regional Dialogues on Security: Developing a New Mechanism 
Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN has been reluctant to engage in formal 
multilateral security consultations and collaboration. In part, because its founding fathers 
were cautious not to let it being perceived as a successor of SEATO, a U.S. sponsored 
military alliance, which therefore would become an easy target to China and Soviet's 
accusations. Any attack by communist countries might ruin ASEAN's effort to maintain 
the image of a non-ideological, non-military and non-antagonistic grouping. In the post-
cold war era, however, ASEAN feels the need to redefine its security approach as the 
regional and global environments are changing. Multilateral consultations on security 
issues, such as Manila Conference on Regional Security in June 1991 and similar 
conference in Thailand in November 1991 marked a new beginning in ASEAN's attitude 
towards regional security approach. ASEAN gave its "blessing" as the decision at the 
Singapore Summit "authorized" ASEAN dialogues on security cooperation [Ref. 18]. 
In the context of a wider Asia-Pacific level, proposals have been made to create 
new regional security institutions to replace the superpower alliance systems of the cold 
war period. The successful Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 
was initially intended as a model for a similar Conference on Security Cooperation in 
Asia (CSCA). However, CSCA was dropped later on for several reasons. First, the United 
States viewed any such institution as a threat to its existing alliance system. In the words 
of a Bush administration official: "While the United States would adjust the form of its 
security role in the region (in the post-cold war era), it tends to retain the substance of 
its role and the bilateral defense relationships which give it structure." [Ref. 18]. Second, 
in the ASEAN leaders view, Asia-Pacific is too complex and diverse a region for CSCE-
type arrangements [Ref. 18]. Third, if regional and external players were to direct their 
attention and resources to creating an Asia-Pacific security forum, it might cause ASEAN 
to "lose its identity". In other words, ASEAN' s share might become insignificant [Ref. 
21]. Moreover, such a grouping might serve the Western members to press ASEAN on 
the contentious issue of human rights [Ref. 18], which had been a central theme of the 
CSCE process. ASEAN would strongly reject any pressure from its Western dialogue 
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partners on human rights or environmental issues as part of their existing consultative 
agenda. 
As an alternative to a formal CSCE-type institution, ASEAN has expressed its 
preference the use of looser and more consultative mechanism such as the ASEAN Post 
Ministerial Conference (PMC), which is a forum of discussion between ASEAN and its 
dialogue partners. To ASEAN members, the PMC framework offers several advantages. 
First, ASEAN would have a controlling influence over the agenda of discussions and 
would not risk being sidelined, as might be the case with any new institution. Second, the 
PMC would enable ASEAN to pursue a more "inclusive" approach to security in the 
context of growing security interdependence between Southeast Asia and the wider Pacific 
region. As argued by a Thai scholar: 
(ASEAN's) effort to establish region wide order in Southeast Asia must 
be related to the larger Asia-Pacific framework of conflict-reduction and 
cooperation, not only because one needs to recognize the geographical and 
economic interdependence that exists in this area, but also because one 
needs to find ways and means of ensuring that extra regional -that is non-
Southeast Asian-powers' involvements in this region continue to be 
"constructive engagements". [Ref. 18]. 
During the ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1991, Japan 
supported the idea of using the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference as a forum for 
regional security dialogue [Ref. 21]. Despite some initial hesitation and a cool response 
from the United States, it was endorsed by A SEAN's ministers at the meeting. The 
subsequent shift in the U.S. attitude towards multilateralism in Asia-Pacific added to the 
appeal of ASEAN PMC. The fact that this institution has been around for some time 
enables it to avoid controversy over its structure and function associated with any new 
institutional framework and makes it more acceptable to countries like the U.S. which are 
apprehensive about the potential of multilateralism to damage its long-established security 
structures. [Ref. 18] 
Besides the expectation of ASEAN PMC becoming a successful forum for regional 
security dialogue, its effectiveness is sti111ikely to be constrained by disagreement over 
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a common security agenda between ASEAN members and their Western counterparts. 
Attempts by the latter to incorporate such "unconventional" threats such as environmental 
degradation and human right abuses would certainly meet ASEAN's strong rejection. 
4. Military Modernization: Arms Race in Southeast Asia? 
Another aspects of consideration for a peaceful Southeast Asia are the defense 
spending and force modernization by ASEAN states. The trends towards increasing 
defense expenditure and the import of sophisticated weapons have in fact led some 
analysts to conclude that post-cold war Southeast Asia is witnessing a regional arms race 
among ASEAN members. Indonesia's defense budget has received 18 percent increase 
in 1993-1994 period, estimated at the total of$ 1.95 billion. Malaysia took similar move 
by increasing its defense spending from M$ 1.5 billion in the 1986-1990 period to a 
fourfold increase of M$ 6 billion in the 1991-1995 period. The Philippines has allocated 
1 0 billion pesos to modernize its armed forces. On the other hand, both Brunei and 
Singapore are likely to maintain a steady rate of increase in their defense expenditure 
while Thailand's defense spending is expected to stabilize in the view of the recent 
decline in the armed forces' influence in the political decision making. [Ref.l8] 
The common features in A SEAN's import of sophisticated weapons include the 
procurement of advanced aircraft, airborne early warning systems and various naval 
platforms to create capabilities beyond coastal defense. Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia 
are acquiring new Hawk jet trainer/strike planes from Britain, while the Philippines has 
bought a mix of Italian (SIAI-Marchetti S-211), Israeli (Kfir) and Czech (Albatros) 
aircrafts. In addition, Thailand and Singapore are buying additional units of the F-16 
fighter aircraft from the United States. At the same time, the naval force modernization 
has also occured in all A SEAN states, marked by the acquisition of missile-equipped large 
patrol crafts and ships. [Ref. 18] 
What drives ASEAN states to purchase those modem weapons? Is intra regional 
competition going on? The evidence suggests that the motives include, but go beyond, 
intra regional competition. First, uncertainties about the military position of extra regional 
powers such as the United States, China, Russia and Japan are the common motivating 
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factor. Second, the end of the cold war has forced the manufacturers from the Western 
and Eastern blocs to compete in the world's market. The availability of wide range and 
large quantities of weapons at bargain prices. combined with the economic prosperity of 
ASEAN states, has made it an attractive opportunity to modernize their forces [Ref. 18. 
24]. Third, above all, those arms purchases reflect the particular needs and national 
security concerns of the buyer countries [Ref. 18, 24]. Brunei, Malaysia and the 
Philippines for example, are developing capabilities to protect offshore resources. All of 
them are now engaging in the Spratlys dispute. Indonesia's naval force modernization 
reflects its position as the largest archipelagic state in the region. Singapore's heavy 
dependence on seaborne commerce explains the country's move to increase sea-lane 
security. 
Will all these moves in acquiring modern weapons lead to destabilization in 
Southeast Asia? Perhaps. But there are also a number of factors that are worth 
considering. First, while the overall spending by ASEAN states has increased, spending 
in relation to the total GNP has actually declined Ref. 18, 25]. Second, no weapons of 
mass destruction seem to be acquired by ASEAN states, which include nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons [Ref. 18]. This put Southeast Asia into different set from the 
"dangerous hot spots", including the Korean Peninsula, South Asia and the Middle East, 
where the proliferation of "unconventional" weapons dominates the regional arms race. 
Third, while territorial disputes and political rivalries between some ASEAN states, i.e., 
Singapore and Malaysia, Malaysia and Thailand might play the role behind the force 
modernization, such rivalries are not evident in other bilateral relationships [Ref. 18]. 
Fourth, the shared need for greater self-reliance in the wake of superpower retrenchment 
from the region, as well as perceived threats from competition among external powers 
such as China, India and Japan should also be considered, that the interactive dynamic 
in weapon acquisitions by ASEAN states should not be overstated [Ref. 18, 25]. 
Nonetheless, concerns have been expressed regarding the current military 
modernization in ASEAN. Whatever the state rationale behind these force modernization 
efforts, their actual impact on interstate relations depends on the future of regional 
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political climate. As the foreign minister of Australia argued: "The sort of precautionery 
worst case thinking which often characterizes strategic planning (in the region) ... could in 
turn generate a destabilizing arms race." [Ref. 18]. 
5. Arms Control vs Defense Cooperation: Managing Competition 
The current military modernization in Southeast Asia has triggered outside experts 
to call for arms control and the creation of a regional body to evaluate defense purchases 
by ASEAN states. Within ASEAN, a similar suggestion has been made by the Malaysian 
defense minister, that "greater transparency in weapon acquisition should be encouraged 
through the creation of a regional arms register based on the U.N. model so that 
suspicions among each other could be minimized and managed." [Ref. 18]. However, no 
action has been taken to follow the proposal. 
On the other hand, ASEAN leaders have argued that arms control may not be a 
necessary element of regional order in Southeast Asia. As the Singapore's defense 
minister pointed out, the "strong ties" among defense heads in ASEAN has helped to 
"foster greater mutual confidence and trust", and the bilateral military exercises among 
ASEAN states have helped to "build links with neighbors, overcome suspicions and 
promote cooperation." [Ref. 18]. 
Although bilateral defense cooperation exists among ASEAN members, a formal 
military alliance has been rejected from the beginning. Apart from being cautious not to 
confront regional problems in military form, there are several reasons to put defense 
cooperation outside the formal framework of ASEAN. As Indonesia's former defense 
chief General Try Sutrisno stated: "Without a military pact...(the ASEAN states) can 
cooperate more flexibly." [Ref. 18]. Echoing the statement was Malaysia's former chief 
of staff's argument that bilateral cooperation still remains preferable to a pact because "it 
allows any ASEAN partner to decide the type, time and scale of aid it requires or can 
provide." Moreover, it ensures that "the question of national independence and sovereignty 
(of members) is unaffected by the decision of others as in the case of an alliance where 
members can invoke the terms of the treaty and interfere in the affairs of another partner." 
[Ref. 18]. 
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Bilateral defense cooperation. however, also finds some limitation to its use as an 
approach to regional order. First. the bilateral defense links within ASEAN are not 
uniformly developed. with the majority of joint exercises taking place between three 
countries: Indonesia. Malaysia and Singapore. Also, some countries establish closer 
relations between each other. An example for a particularly close relationship is between 
Brunei and Singapore, probably because of their shared views and feelings about their 
positions and relationships with other ASEAN states. On the other hand, defense relations 
between Brunei and Malaysia remain low-key due to strained political ties, as the result 
of Brunei's suspicion of Malaysian interference in its domestic affairs. Second, a 
significant degree of integration and inter-operability have not yet developed. The 
diversity in defense doctrine, language and strategic priorities limit the benefits to be 





In its intramural dimension, ASEAN has provided a stable structure of relations 
for managing and containing tensions among its member states. Yes it is true that the 
record has indicated some stormy relations among members, and that institutional 
provision for dispute settlement has not yet been put into effect. However, a collective 
ability to sustain a working relationships among members is proof of the value placed 
on continued membership. As Michael Leifer wrote [Ref. 2]: "No member government 
has found its interests so imperiled by corporate priorities that it has contemplated 
withdrawal. Correspondingly, nor has any member government been found guilty of so 
transgressing corporate rules that expulsion has been considered." 
In its external dimension, ASEAN has displayed a quality of political cohesion and 
diplomatic accomplishment. Its efforts in the U.N. to deny Vietnam's dominance in 
Indochina has earned the Association the status of a diplomatic community. But as Hilson 
Kurus pointed out [Ref. 6], the evidence, pointing towards such a direction had been 
obvious since early 1970s. As a diplomatic tool, ASEAN has proved to be useful to its 
member governments in pursuing their individual as well as collective interests. 
The key to understanding ASEAN's mechanism of decision making is well 
provided by Michael Haas' The Asian Way [Ref. 17]. Derived from a shared common 
culture of Asia, the Asian Way is actually the philosophy of Asian people. With all its 
merits and limitations such as: time consuming discussion, slow progress, etc. the Asian 
Way is the way ASEAN is doing its business. As such, it sezved as a useful tool for 
better understanding of, and predicting the behavioral pattern of, ASEAN. 
In the post-Cold War era, ASEAN is faced with a new challenge as the result of 
the collapse of the communism. However, the strategic uncertainties derived from global 
and regional changes has created a sense of insecurity among member governments. In 
this context, ASEAN has not prepared any blueprint or a masterplan to cope with a new 
environment. Instead, ASEAN still relies on its own guiding principle of the Asian Way, 
ensuring that it has a significant voice in determining the future of Southeast Asia. 
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